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1. Introduction and motivation
It is common in survey sampling to decompose the random process behind the observa-
tions into distinct random processes: the variable of interest generation, the design variable
generation, the sample selection according to the design, the non response, the measure-
ment error, ...etc. This has been explained by Pfeffermann et al. (1998) as well as Skinner
(1994). Rubin (1976) explains what it means to ignore a particular random process (the
one that causes missing data) for a particular type of inference (likelihood based inference).
Sugden & Smith (1984) oppose the notions of informative selection Scott (1975) and the
notion of ignorable missing data mechanism. We have not found a unique definition of in-
formative process, but rather different ad-hoc definitions, that can be applied in different
statistical frameworks. Scott (1977), commenting on Godambe (1966), suggests that in a
Bayesian framework that a selection is ”informative” if the posterior distribution of some
estimates depends only on the sample drawn and not on the design used to use it. ? defines
what ignoring a missing data mechanism means and gives sufficient conditions under which
the likelihood based inference will not be affected after ignoring the missing data mecha-
nism. ? gives a heuristic definition of informative selection as a process that has to be taken
into account in the inference.Pfeffermann et al. (1998) also defines the sample distribution
by opposition to the population distribution, and focuses on one of the possible effect of
informative selection: under informative selection, the sample distribution is different from
the population distribution. There exists other definitions in the litterature that focus on
the possible causes of informative selection: Cassel et al. (1977) explains that selection is
informative when the design variable or the design is dependent on the study variable. Other
authors have a very restrictive and convoluted definition, as Fuller (2011) for whom infor-
mative selection occurs when the distribution of the inclusion probabilities conditionnally to
the design variable and the study variable depends on the study variable. There are issues
with the two last definitions: Cassel et al. (1977) provides a definition in a fixed population
model for design-based inference, under which design and study variables are not random,
so are stochastically independent, so the definition has no interest. Even when transposed
to a model based framework, this definition is not satisfying. Indeed, when sampling with
replacement, even independent on the study variable, and the population index on the sam-
ple is not observed, the early papers by Scott (1977), or Rubin (1976) do not consider this
case, but if we follow their reasoning, sampling with replacement should be considered as
informative. The definition of Fuller (2011) is too restrictive, and wrong: for example, in
cluster sampling where all clusters have the same probability to be selected, the inclusion
probabilities are constant, but the selection is informative as it induces dependence among
the observations on the sample (see Bonne´ry (2011)). So there is a need to clarify what
informative selection means. One can size this opportunity to define, in general, what an in-
formative vs ignorable process is. This could be applied to a coarsening process for example
(see Heitjan & Rubin (1991)). The task of defining what an ignorable vs. informative process
is reminds the attempts to define ancillarity and sufficiency in the presence of a nuisance
parameter as the framework is the same: we are in presence of two random processes, one is
the process of interest, and the second a nuisance process. Any distribution in a model can
be viewed as the combinaision of a marginal distribution of the process of interest and of the
5
distribution of the nuisance process conditionnally on the process of interest. This framework
is used in Rubin (1976). Nevertheless, it is not straighforward to propose a definition as it
has be applicable to different statistical frameworks, and has to take into account the type
of inference(Bayesian, frequentist), the goal of the inference (testing, estimation, prediction,
model selection), the nature of the random process with respect to the observations (is the
ignorable random process observed or latent), the criteria to define equivalent models (mod-
els under which estimators have the same bias, the same distribution, ...), as well as what
we will call the injectivity of the model separation into the marginal model for the process of
interest and the conditional model on the nuisance process. The two last aspects require to
address issues that were not raised in the papers by Scott (1975) and Rubin (1976): both of
them consider the sample index as observed, but in practice (for example for web surveys) it
may happen that one cannot identify the units for each observation of the sample, and one
may not be able to identify duplicates for example: the sample index is considered as latent,
and Rubin (1976) lists as a necessary condition for ignorability the separability of the model
into the process of interest marginal model by the nuisance process conditional model.
We can follow the early papers by Godambe (1966),Scott (1975) and Rubin (1976), to
setup a definition of informative or ignorable process. These are the steps to follow: 1. Pro-
vide a general framework and formalise the condition that the observations are the outcome
of two random processes, 2. Consistently with Rubin (1976), generalise the notion of ig-
noring one process introduced by to this general framework, for Bayesian or frequentist
inference. 3. Consistently with Rubin (1976), explain what equivalent inferences from differ-
ent models mean, especially detail what it means when one or the two processes are latent
processes. 4. Define an ignorable process (and by opposition an informative process) as any
process whose ignorance will lead to an equivalent inference. After we get a definition for
informative vs. ignorable process, we will critically examine the existing definitions found in
the litterature.
In section 2, we give some mathematical background for the different notions that will
be defined. In section 3, we propose a general framework for survey sampling. In section 4,
we propose to generalise the notion of ignoring a random process. In section 5, we give the
definition of ignorable versus informative process, and we characterise such processes. Section
6 is a discussion on different topics, including a critical examination of the different definitions
of informative selecction that can be found in the scientific litterature, we also discuss the link
between the notions of informativity and information, sufficiency and ancillarity in presence
of nuisance parameters, as well as the debate on the likelihood principle. In appendix, we
provide notes on a selection of papers that are link more or less closely to the current topic.
2. Mathematical notations and tools
For clarity, it is imperative to remove any notation or concepts ambiguity. Especially
with respect with the term dependence when applied to deterministic functions. Quoting
Neyman & Pearson (1936), “it is inevitable, [...] that a paper dealing with [the] problem [of
what conclusions regarding sufficient statistics may be drawn from the existence of uniformly
most powerful tests, or vice versa] should bear some mark of the theory of functions, in spite
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of its concern with statistical questions”. This effort was visible in Barndorff-Nielsen (1973)
who cautiously defined “variation independence”, in Rubin (1976) who cautiously defined
“distinct parameters”, or in Basu (1977) who reproduced definitions usefull for his paper.
We have listed all the concepts required to define an informative latent or observed process
in this section.
We tried to follow this rule for notations: non random elements are denoted with lowercase
roman letters, random variables with uppercase roman letters, domains and codomains with
calligraphic uppercase roman letters, functions on the model distributions will be bold greek
letters, and the values they take greek non bold letters.
2.1. Set theory: notation conventions and definitions
The following conventions on functions will be used in this document. Notations 1. to 6. below
can also be found in Dummit & Foote (n.d., (Section 0.1. Basics)). 1. Given two sets E and
F , E →F is the set of all functions from E to F . 2. The statement “let h ∶ E →F” means
“let E and F be two sets” if they are not already defined and “let h ∈ E →F”. 3. The domain
of h will be denoted domain(h), its codomain: codomain(h), and its image or range image(h).
4. The statement “h ∶ E →” means “let h be a function defined on E ” (the codomain is not
always specified). 5. The statement “h ∶ N → N, ∶ x ↦ x + 1” means let h be the function
mapping N to N defined by the formal expression h(x) = x+1. 6. Let h ∶ E →F , h′ ∶ F → G ,
then h′(h) is the function h′ ○ h ∶ E → G , x ↦ h′(h(x)). 7. Let h ∶ E →F , h′ ∶ E → (F → G ),
v ∈ F , then h′[h] is the function h′[h] ∶ E → G , x ↦ (h′(x))(h(x)), and h′[v] is the function
h′[v] ∶ E → G , x ↦ (h′(x))(v). 8. Let h ∶ E →F , E ′ ⊆ E . Then h∣
E ′
denotes the restriction of
h to E ′ defined as h∣
E ′
∶ E ′ →F , x ↦ h(x). 9. Let h ∶ E → {subsets of F}, h′ ∶ E → (F → G ),
then
h′∣[h] ∶ E → ⋃F ′⊆F (F ′ → G ),
x ↦ h′∣[h](x) ∶ h(x) → G ,
y ↦ (h′(x))(y).
10. For h ∶ E →, let ∼h be the equivalence relation on E defined by x ∼h x′ ↔ h(x) = h(x′).
The set of classes of E for ∼h is denoted E /h, the class of x for ∼h is classh(x) = h−1 ({h(x)}).
11. The identity on a set E is denoted IdE , 1E =∶ E → 1, x ↦ 1, and for A ∈ E , 1A ∶
A → {0,1}, x ↦ 1 if x ∈ A, 0 otherwise. 12. Given h, h′ ∶ E →, then h and h′ are variation
independent and one notes h ⊥ h′ if and only image(h,h′) = image(h)×image(h′), 13. h ∶ E →
(deterministically) depends only on h′ ∶ E → and one notes h ≺ h′ if and only if ∃g ∶→ such
that h = g ○ h′.
Property-Definition 1 (Complement and distinct complement of a function). Let h ∶
E →, then a complement of h is any function h¯ ∶ E → such that (classh, classh¯) ∶ E →(E /h) × (E /h¯), x ↦ (classh(x), classh¯(x))) is injective. If a function h¯ satisfies this property,
it will be called a complement of h, and we will write (h, h¯) ⊵ E . If classh,h¯ is bijective (e.g.
if in addition h ⊥ h¯), then h¯ is called a distinct or variation independent complement, and
we will write (h, h¯) Ü E , if not, we will write (h, h¯) ⊳ E . For a complement h¯ of h, define the
7
function ⊓h,h¯ ∶ {h(x), h¯(x) ∶ x ∈ E } → E as the inverse of (classh, classh¯)∣image((classh,classh¯)).
There always exists a complement (for example, IdE is a complement of h), and a sufficient
condition for a distinct complement of a function h ∶ E → to exist, is that all the classes
classh(x), x ∈ E are in bijection one with another.
Remark 1 (Link with distinct parameters, variation independence, and variation inde-
pendent complement.). The definition of variation independence of parameters is given by
Barndorff-Nielsen (1973, p. 2.1.2.), Rubin (1976, Definition 3) uses the term distinct pa-
rameters, whereas Basu (1977, p. 357) uses the term variation independent complement of
a parameter.
Examples 1. 1. Let E = {(0,0), (0,1), (1,0)}, and let h ∶ (x1, x2) ↦ x1. Then h ⊳ E
: the bijection is only possible if the cardinal of E is the product of the cardinals of E /h
and E /h¯, and 3 is not a multiple of 2. Consider the complement h ∶ (x1, x2) ↦ x2 ,
then h¯(x) = 1 ⇒ h(x) = 0), whereas h¯(x) = 0 ⇏ h(x) = 0 and h¯(x) = 0 ⇏ h(x) = 1.
When h ⊳ E , the knowledge of h¯(x) may or may not restrict the set of possible
values for h(x). More generally, h Ü E if all the elements of E /h are in bijection
with each other. 2. Let E = {(0,0), (0,1), (1,0), (1,1)}, and let h, h¯ be formally de-
fined as above. Then (h, h¯) Ü E : in this case, the knowledge of h¯(x) does not re-
strict the set of possible values for h(x). 3. Consider the familiy of prabability dis-
tributions P = (Normal(µ,σ2))(µ,σ2)∈R×R+, then (h, h¯) Ü P for h ∶ P ↦ ∫ xdP (x),
h¯ ∶ P ↦ ∫ (x − h(P ))2 dP (x). 4. Consider a statistical model (Ω,SΩ,P), a random vari-
able X ∶ (Ω,SΩ) →, θ ∶ (P ↦ P IdΩ∣X) and θ¯ ∶ (P ↦ PX) then (θ, θ¯) ⊵ P. If furthermore∀P,P ′ ∈ P, (P ′′ ∶SΩ → [0,1],A↦ ∫ P ′(A ∣ X = x)dPX(x)) ∈ P, then (θ, θ¯) Ü P.
2.2. Probability and Statistics Theory
The following concepts from Probability theory will be used in the paper. 1. Given a space
Ω, SΩ always denotes a sigmafield on Ω. 2. The set of all measurable functions from (E ,SE )
to (F ,SF ) is denoted (E ,SE )→ (F ,SF ). 3. The statement “let X ∶ (E ,SE )→ (F ,SF )”
means “let (E ,SE ) and (F ,SF ) be two measurable spaces ” if they are not already defined
and “let X be a measurable function from the measurable space (E ,SE ) to the measurable
space (F ,SF )”. (F ,SF ) may be omitted. 4. The sub-sigmafield of SΩ generated by a
random variable X ∶ (Ω,SΩ) → (F ,SF ) is denoted S(X) and is defined by S(X) ={X−1(A) ∶ A ∈ SX }. 5. Given a measure P on (Ω,SΩ) and X ∶ (Ω,SΩ) → (X ,SX ), PX
is the measure on (X ,SX ) defined by: PX(A) = P (X−1(A)). 6. Given a subsigmafield
S′Ω of SΩ, the conditional probability of A “given the most accurate desctiption of ω by
means of statements of S′Ω”(See Sverdrup, 1966, p. ) is denoted P (A ∣ S′Ω, ω). For all
A ∈ SΩ, the function ω ↦ P (A ∣ S′, ω) does always exist and is P -almost uniquely defined.
7. Given two random variables V1, V2, P V1∣V2 is a function: (A,ω) ↦ P (V −11 (A) ∣ S(V2), ω).
It satisfies: P V1∣V2 ≺ ((A,ω)↦ (A,V2(ω))), which defines P V1∣V2=v2 ∶ A ↦ P V1∣V2(A,ω) for
ω ∈ V2−1({v2}), and v2 ↦ P V1∣V2=v2 is defined P V2-almost uniquely. Given A ∈ SΩ, define
P V ∣A = P V ∣1A=1. 8. Let (Ω,SΩ), (Ω′,S′Ω) be a measurable space. A function P ∶ Ω′ → (SΩ →
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[0,1]), (ω′) ↦ (A ↦ Pω′(A)) is a transition probability function from (Ω,SΩ), (Ω′,S′Ω)
to ∀ω′ ∈ Ω′ if and only if Pω′ is a probability measure and if ∀A ∈ SΩ, ω′ → Pω′(A) is
measurable. 9. Given a measurable space (Ω,SΩ), a probability space (Ω′,SΩ′ , P ′) and a
transition probability function P from (Ω′,SΩ′) to (Ω,SΩ), the probability induced by P and
P ′ is ⟨ω′ ↦ Pω′ ∣ P ′⟩Ω,Ω′ ∶SΩ →,A ↦ ∫Ω′ Pω′(A) dP ′(ω′). 10. Given two measures P,P ′ onSΩ,
S′Ω, respectively P ⊗P ′ is the measure on the sigma-field on Ω×Ω′ generated by the products
of elements A of SΩ and B of S′Ω such that for any such elements, (P ⊗P ′)(A×B) = P (A)×
P ′(B). 11. Given A ∈SΩ, P V ∣A is the probability distribution P V ∣1A=1 ∶ B ↦ P (V −1(B)∩A).
12. For a set of probability distributions P on (Ω,SΩ),
E ∶ P → ,
P ↦ EP ∶ ((Ω,SΩ)→) ∪ ((Ω,SΩ)→)2 → ((Ω,SΩ)→) ,(X1,X2) ↦ EP (X1 ∣ X2) = ∫ x1dPX1∣X2,
X ↦ EP (X) = ∫ XdP
so E[X] ∶ P ↦ EP (X). The quantity EP (X) may take the value “undefined”. 13. When
we write conditional probabilities or expected values, we implicitely assume that they are
defined. Given a probability P on a measurable space (Ω,SΩ), random variables X1,X2,
X3, PX1∣X2 = PX1∣X3 means that for all f a positive measurable function on (X1(Ω), PX1),
EP (f(X1) ∣ X2) P−a.s.= EP (f(X1) ∣ X3). 14. Given a statistical model (Ω, SΩ,{P ∈ P}),
when writing density and conditional densities, we implicitely assume all necessary
conditions for these densities to be defined, including that P is dominated by a σ-finite
measure ζ . If P is absolutely continuous with respect to ζ , then for any random variable
V , P V is absolutely continuous with respect to ζV ((See Halmos & Savage, 1949, p. 229)).
The expression fV ;P will denote a density of P V with respect to ζV . Given an additional
random variables W , fV ∣W=w;P(v) is defined as as fV ∣W=w;P(v) = fV,W ;P(v,w)/fV ;P (v)
when fV ;P (w) > 0, 0 otherwise. We assume that densities, conditional densities and condi-
tional distributions are chosen to be compatible, so that the following properties are satisfied:
(a) f(V,W );P (v,w) = fV ∣W=w;P(v)fV ;P (v) = fW ∣V =v;P (w)fW ;P (w) (b) P V ∣W=w(A) = ∫A fV ∣W=w;P(v)dζV ∣W=w(v). (c) fV ;P (v) =∫W (Ω) fW,V ;P (w,v)dζV ∣W=w(v). (d) ∫W (Ω) fW ∣V =v;P (w)dζW ∣V =v(w) = 1. 15. Given compatible
densities {f.∣.;P ∶ P ∈ P}, the likelihood of θ in θ given X1 = x1 conditionnally to X2 = x2
is defined as L (θ;X1 ∣ X2)(θ;x1 ∣ x2) = sup {fX1∣X2=x2;P (x1)∣P ∈ θ−1(θ)} . The maximum
likelihood estimator of θ(P ) is the (non necessarily non empty or reduced to one element)
set argmax{L (θ;X)(θ;x) ∶ θ ∈ θ(P)}.
3. A generic model for survey sampling and other
areas of Statistics.
In Section 4, definitions of “at random”, “R-ignorable” and “non informative” will be given in
a general statistical model. To illustrate this definitions with real-life models including many
common models used when analysing survey data, we introduce in Section 3.1 a more par-
ticular model that will be called the “X = x(T,T [Y ],Z)”-model. In section 3.3, we present
usual models used in survey sampling and show how they can be written as particular cases
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of the “X = x(T,T [Y ],Z)”-model. We show that the “X = x(T,T [Y ],Z)”-model can be
used for design-based, model based or bayesian inference, missing data models, models with
auxiliary information, selection with or without replacement ...etc. Doing so we define a
series of common random variables or parameters used in survey sampling, as the sample,
the sample indicators, the design, the design variables, the inclusion probabilities of different
orders, ...etc, In section 3.4, we present real-life statistical models that account for transfor-
mations of the signal not necessarily limited to survey sampling such as noise addition, that
also fit the “X = x(T,T [Y ],Z)”-model.
3.1. The “X = x(T,T [Y ],Z)” model
Define the “X = x(T,T [Y ],Z) model as the statistical model (Ω,SΩ, P )P ∈P), where Ω is
a subset of the product of three spaces: Ω ⊆ (X ×Z ×T ), for which T ⊆ (Y →) and on
which three random variables are defined, that correspond to the projections on X ,Z ,T
with respect to the previous space product: the signal Y ∶ (Ω,SΩ) → (Y ,SY ), the trans-
formation conditioning variable Z ∶ (Ω,SΩ) → (Z ,SZ ), and the transformation
mechanism of the signal T ∶ (Ω,SΩ)→ (T ,ST ). Assume that
∀P ∈ P, P T ∣Y,Z = P T ∣Z . (1)
The observations consist of the image by a deterministic and known function “x” of the
triplet (T [Y ], T,Z): X = x(T [Y ], T,Z), and the statistician works with the model
(codomain(X),Scodomain(X),{PX ∣ P ∈ P}) .
When doing Bayesian inference, a set {Q ∈ Q} of prior distributions is defined on P.
3.2. Inference
Let θ ∶ (P × X ) →, such that ∃θ′ ∶ ({P Y ∣ P ∈ P} × {Y (ω) ∣ ω ∈ Ω}) → for which θ =
θ′ ○ (P ↦ P Y , Y ).
The target of the inference is θ: when θ(P,ω) is free of ω (e.g. θ = θ′ ○ (P ↦ P Y )), the
goal is to estimate θ(P ), whereas when θ(P,ω) is free of P (e.g. θ = θ′ ○ Y ), the goal is to
predict θ(ω). The model for the observations is: {PX ∣ P ∈ P}.
3.3. Examples of models used in survey sampling
As explained by Pfeffermann & Sverchkov (2009), the observations from a survey are the out-
put of two random processes: the population generation and the sample selection, so survey
sampling models account for those two processes. The framework we described in Subsection
3.1 allows to distinguish those two processes: Y is the population generation, and the obser-
vation on a random selection of units is the observation of a random transformation T [Y ] of
Y . In this subsection, we show that the simple general framework of Subsection 3.1 can cover
all situations encountered in survey sampling. In survey sampling, there exists a diversity
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of paradigms : model based inference, design based inference, bayesian inference, that imply
different population models (fixed population model, superpopulation models, ...), that are
associated with different population and observation models. Populations models specifici-
ties come from: 1. the population size that can be observed or unobserved, a parameter or
a random variable, 2. the population that can be finite, infinite, discrete, or continuous (for
example for spatial data). 3. the population characteristics can be considered random or a
parameter. The model will also reflect specificities about what is observed and how samples
were obtained: 1. the sample can also be finite, discrete, or continuous, 2. the sampling can
be with or without replacement, 3. one may or may not be able to link sample units to
population units, 4. sampling weights may or may not be observed, 5. design variables may
or may not be observed, 6. duplicates may or may not be identifiable. 7. measurement may
be with or without errors errors. We propose a general model that embraces all those cases,
we show that Design, inclusion probabilities, that can be observed, are functions of a design
variable Z, whereas the correspondance between the sample index and the population index
is a function of T , so that in the general case, observations are a function of (T,T [Y ],Z).
Definition 2 (Population model). When Y is of the form ⋃u∈U (u → Y ′), where Y ′ is
a set and U is a collection of sets, and when ∃U ∶ Ω → U is such that ∀ω ∈ Ω, Y (ω) ∈(U(ω)→ Y ′), we will say that Y follows a population model and the random variable U will
be called the population, N ∶ ω ↦ cardinality(U(ω)) will be the population size.
In survey sampling, we usually consider selection under a finite population model. Fre-
quentist inference consider two parametric types of population models refered to as fixed
population model for design-based inference (Cassel et al. , 1977), Gourieroux (1981, p. 52))
and superpopulation model for model-based inference. There exists different interpretations
of a superpopulation model. Nevertheless, in practice, it consists in using a model on Y that
is not the fixed population model. Nathan (2011) gives more details about the origin of the
term superpopulation and the design-based versus model-based inference debate. For our
purpose, which is only to propose general definitions, the only thing that matters is to con-
sider a framework such as 2 general enough to fit any population model, a fixed population
model or a superpopulation model.
Definition 3 (Fixed population model). The fixed population model corresponds to the
special case where {P Y ∣ P ∈ P} = {Dirac{y} ∣ y ∈ Y } where Y = ⋃u∈U u → Y ′.
Another example of fixed populations are fixed excnageable population models, (see
Sugden (1979)), that are models where the population index does not carry any information.
Under an exchangeable population model, forall population size u ∈ U , P Y ∣U=u is invariant
by any permutation of u, e.g. for all P ∈ P, for all permutation σ of u, one must have
P Y ∣U=u = P Y [σ]∣U=u.
Example 2 (Fixed exchangeable population model ). An exchange-
able fixed finite population model is of the form {P Y ∶ P ∈ P} ={(cardinality(domain(y))!)−1∑σ∈Ay Diracy○σ ∶ y ∈ Y }, where Y is defined as in
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Definition 3, U contains only finite non empty sets, and here Ay is the set of permutation
of the codomain of y.
Definition 4 (Sample selection from population). Assume that Y follows a population
model, then we will say that T is a selection or sample selection (from the population)
when ∀ω ∈ Ω, ∃ a set L(ω) called sample index, a function R(ω) from L(ω) to U(ω) called
a sample to population indexes mapping, such that:
T ∶ Ω → ,
ω ↦ T (ω) ∶ (U(ω)→ Y ′) → ,
y ↦ (T (ω))(y) ∶ L(ω) → Y ′,
ℓ ↦ y ((R (ω)) (ℓ)) .
Which, by using the [.] notations, can be written when U is constant, T [y] = y ○R. In fine,
T [Y ] = Y [R], and when PL-a.s(l), l = {1, . . . , n⋆}, for ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , n⋆}, (Y [R])[ℓ] = Y [R[ℓ]]
can be interpretated as the value of Y for the individual selected at the ℓth draw. When
PR − a.s(r), r is injective, we say that the selection R is without replacement.
Definition 5 (Selection count J and selection indicator I). For ω ∈ Ω, we define the
(without replacement) sample S(ω) = R(ω)(L(ω)) as the image of the function R(ω). We
define the selection indicator I ∶ ω ↦ I(ω) ∶ powerset(U(ω)) → {0,1},A ↦ (I[A])(ω) = 1 if
A ∪ S(ω) ≠ ∅ and 0 otherwise, and J ∶ ω ↦ J(ω) ∶ powerset(U(ω)) → N,A ↦ J[A](ω) =
cardinality ((R(ω))−1 (A)).
Example 3. Assume a population model. For k ∈ U , Y [k] is the income of individual k. As-
sume a selection with replacement and random size. Let ω ∈ Ω and denote t = T (ω), r = R(ω)
and assume N(ω) = 8 and n(ω) = 5, so U(ω) = u = {1, . . . 8}, and ℓ = L(ω) = {1, . . . ,5}. As-
sume the units drawn for the draw 1 to 5 were r(1) = 3, r(2) = 1, r(3) = 5, r(4) = 3, r(5) = 2
respectively, so r is the function ∶ ℓ→ u, 1↦ 3, 2↦ 1, 3↦ 5, 4↦ 3, 5↦ 2 and t is the func-
tion ∶ (u → R) → (ℓ→ R) , y ↦ t(y) = (y ○ r ∶ ℓ→ R, ℓ ↦ y(r(ℓ))). Note that the selection is
with replacement as r(1) = r(4) = 3. The sample indicator vector is (I[1](ω), . . . , I[8](ω)) =(1,1,1,0,1,0,0,0) and the sample count vector is (J[1](ω), . . . J[8](ω)) = (1,1,2,0,1,0,0,0).
Definition 6 (Design and design variables). A design is a random variable D such that∀ω ∈ Ω, ∆(ω) is a probability measure on ⋃l∈L {l → U(ω)}, where L is a set of possible
sample indexes, and ∀P ∈ P,
PR∣∆,Y,Z P−a.s.= ∆. (2)
PR∣D,Y,Z = D: we have a random distribution on one side, and a conditional probability in the other side.
More rigourous notation would be
PD,Y -a.s(d, y, z), PR∣D=d,Y =y,Z=z = d.
as distributions conditional to a r.v. X are defined PX -a.s
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Example 4 (Simple random sampling). Let n⋆,N⋆ ∈ N. Simple random sampling without
replacement of size n⋆ between N⋆ is the uniform distribution on the set (denoted here by A)
of functions from {1, . . . , n} to {1, . . . ,N}: δ = (N⋆)−n⋆ ∑r∈BDiracr, whereas when n⋆ ≤ N⋆,
simple random sampling without replacement of size n⋆ between N⋆ is the uniform distribu-
tion on the set (denoted here by B) of injective functions from {1, . . . , n⋆} to {1, . . . ,N⋆}:
δ = n⋆!(N⋆!)−1∑r∈BDiracr.
This series of examples illustrate that our general framework applies to any situation, and
allow to discriminate between the different mathematical objects which ones are a function
of Y , which ones are a function of T and which ones are a function of Z.
It is important to notice that the population is a function of ∆, e.g. U ≺ ∆, as ∀ω, ∆(ω)
is a probability distribution on a set of mappings to U(ω). So when conditioning on ∆ = δ,
U is not random. When defining inclusion probabilities, it is then not necessary to condition
on both the design and the population.
Because U can be deduced from ∆, the expression EP (I[k] ∣ D) has a meaning. The
expression EP (I) may not have sense as we are taking the expected value of a random
vector that take values in spaces of different dimensions when U is random, but EP (I ∣ U)
does and so does EP (I ∣∆) as U ≺∆.
Definitions 7 (Inclusion and selection probability densities). For each u ∈ U , consider a
σ-field Su on u, and a measure µu on Su. The functions ∶Su →,A ↦ EP (I[A] ∣∆ = δ) and ∶
Su →,A ↦ EP (J[A] ∣∆ = δ) are probability measure and measure respectively that may admit
Radon Nykodym derivatives with respect to µU(ω). Equation (2) implies that these measures
do not depend on P , but depend on δ only: EP (I[A] ∣∆ = δ) = δ ({r ∶→ u ∣ A ∩ image(r) ≠ ∅})
and EP (J[A] ∣∆ = δ) = ∫ (cardinality (r−1(A))d (δ(r)).
1. The inclusion probability density function is the Radon Nikodym derivative Π(ω) =
d(A ↦ EP (I[A] ∣∆ = ∆(ω)))/dµU(ω) when defined.
2. The selection density function is the Radon Nikodym derivative Υ(ω) = d(A ↦
EP (J[A] ∣∆ = ∆(ω)))/dµU(ω) when defined.
If ∀u ∈ U , u is countable and µu is the counting measure, then (Π[k])k∈U is the inclusion
probabilities of each unit being on the sample conditionnally on the design ∆ : Π[k] =
E(I[k] ∣∆ = ∆(ω)).
Property 1 (The sum of inclusion probabilities equal the sample size). Let ω ∈ Ω, let
u = U(ω), δ = ∆(ω),υ = Υ(ω) and π = Π(ω), then ∀P , ∫u πdµu = EP (nwor ∣ ∆ = δ) and∫u υdµu = E[n ∣∆ = δ], where nwor =∑k∈U I[k] is the sample without duplicates.
Definition 8 (Design variable). Often the design is a function of design variables, denoted
Z, that are variables defined on the population, and D = PR∣Z.
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Example 5 (Stratified sampling). Consider a population model such that Y ′ = R, let H ∈
N, let Z be a random variable such that ∀ω, Z(ω) ∶ U(ω)→ {1, . . . ,H}. Define Nh(ω) = #{k ∈
U(ω) ∣ Z[k](ω) = h}, and let nh be a random variable such that ∀ω.nh(ω) ∈ {0, . . . ,Nh(ω)}
and such that ∑h nh = n. Define D(ω) as the uniform distribution on the set of injective
functions r from {1, . . . , n(ω)} to U(ω) such that ∀h ∈ {1, . . . ,H}, #{ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , n(ω)} ∣
Zr(ℓ) = h} = nh(ω). Then D is the stratified sampling based on the stratification Z with
allocation n1, . . . , nh and simple random sampling within strata.
Remark 2 (Observations). Observations,denoted X, are a function of (T [Y ],Z,T ). We
show that this notation includes many possible scenarii. In practice, different situations may
happen, we may or may not observe the population size, we may or may not observe the
index of the values Y [k], we may or may not observe the number of times each unit was
selected, we may or may not observe the inclusion probabilities for the whole population or
the sample units. We may or may not oberve the design that was used. We may or may not
observe auxiliary information. If X = T [Y ] and the sample is with replacement, and unequal
probabilities, then one is not able to identify duplicates. In the case X = (T [Y ], T , one can
deduce R from T , so be able to identify the units and the duplicates. If X = (T [Y ], T,D) (D
is a function of Z), then one can deduce U , the inclusion probabilities, the double inclusion
probabilities, all the units. If X = (T [Y ],Π(R[L]), one cannot identify the sampled units,
and knows the inclusion probabilities for the sampled units only. When the sample is without
replacement and the population index observed on the sample, T [Y ] = Y [R] = Y ∣[S].
Definition 9 (Models on the observations). All different models for inference on survey
data can be written with the same expression: {PX ∣ P ∈ P}. Thanks to this simple expres-
sion, we can define the different concepts of interest without depending on a particular case.
Example 6 (Parametric model for design based inference, Gourieroux (1981, p. 52)). In the
classic case of finite sample selection from finite population, with fixed population u and fixed
design δ model, is the combinaison of a parametric model for the population of the form {P Y ∣
P ∈ P} = {Diracy ∣ y ∈ Y = ⋃u∈U {u→ Y ′}}, and of a parametric model for the design {P∆ ∣
P ∈ P} such that u ⊂ {Diracδ ∣ δ ∈ {probability measures on (⋃n∈N ({1, . . . , n}→ u))}}. If for
example the observation is X = T [Y ] = Y [R], then the parametric model for the observation
is: {PX ∣ P ∈ P} = {dgy ∣ y ∈ Y , δ ∈ domain(y)}, where gy ∶ (r ∶ {1, . . . , n} → domain(y))↦ y ○ r.
When δ and u are known, the model is then just {PX ∣ P ∈ P} = {dgy ∣ y ∈ (u → Y ′)}.
3.4. The “X = x(T,T [Y ],Z)” model applies to other areas of
statistics
Selection is not the only possible transformation that one can think of. In Statistics, there
is usually a true phenomenon of interest, and we can perceive some signal, that can be
perturbated. The definitions we propose in Section 3.1 are general enough to embrace this
situation.
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Example 7 (Measurement error). Assume Y is a dichotomous random variable that we
observe for each units of a known population of size N with measurement error. The random
variable domain is Y = {1, . . . ,N}→ {0,1}, and define Z as a measurement error indicator:
Z ∶ (Ω.SΩ) → ({1, . . . ,N} → {0,1}). Assume independent measurement error for each unit
with probability θ¯, and error independent on Y : ∀P ∈ P, P (Y,Z) = P Y ⊗ PZ and ∀P ∈ P,
∃θ ∈ [0,1] such that ∀z ∶ ({1, . . . ,N} → {0,1} P ({Z = z}) = θ¯∑Nk=1 z(k)(1 − θ¯)∑Nk=1(1−z(k)).
Then ∀ω ∈ Ω, T (ω) ∶ Y → Y , y ↦ y × Z(ω) + (1 − y) × (1 − Z(ω), so that T [Y ](ω) =
Y (ω)Z(ω) + (1 − Y ((ω))) × (1 −Z(ω)..
Example 8. Assume Y is the trajectory of a rocket. We observe the signal T [Y ] = (Yt +
εt)t∈{t1,...,t10}. In this case, we can see that we do not observe all the points of the trajectory,
and some noise has been added in the signal. The determination of the points t1, . . . , t10 can
be informative, for example, we may not observe the rocket when it is deviated. The noise
may also be more important when the rocket is deviated as the sensors may be perturbated
by the origin of the deviation. Asking the question : Is the transformation informative ? is
pertinent as well.
Example 9. Heitjan & Rubin (1991), Jacobsen & Keiding (1995) define the notion of
coarsening at random. This is also a case where the observation is the result of a pertur-
bated measure, where the perturbation in this case is made willingly to protect privacy.
Example 10. Wu & Bailey (2016) describe right censoring in the case of clinical trials,
and call this process informative. Our general framework also applies
Example 11. Consider a stochastic process (for example, electricity consumption of a
group of households) measured on a grid, where the interval between two measuremnts will
depend on the previous measurements (interval length will be reduced when volatility will be
high, or when high values will be reached). The random process we are interested in is the
consumption over the time, but the signal we obtain is a transformation of this signal. Our
general framework also applies. The censoring is a random transformation that transforms
the uncensored data into the censored data.
4. When observations are the outcome of two or more
random processes
It is common in survey sampling to decompose the random process behind the observations
into distinct random processes: the variable of interest generation, the design variable gen-
eration, the sample selection according to the design, the non response, the measurement
error, ...etc. This has been explained by Pfeffermann et al. (1998) as well as Skinner (1994).
Rubin (1976) explains what it means to ignore a particular random process (the one that
causes missing data) for a particular type of inference (likelihood based inference). In this
section, we propose to generalise the definition of ignoring one of the random processes at
the origin of the observations, as well as a to-go guide to define the concepts of informative,
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at random, or ignorable in different situations. The first step is to start from a model, and
to transform this model by ignoring one of the generating processes. The second step is to
specify the target of the inference, and to make sure that this target has a meaning in the
transformed model. The third step is to compare the inference on the target in the original
model with the inference on the transformed target in the transformed model. Based on the
type of inference and the type of target, the comparison may be based on different criteria
(same likelihood, same properties of an estimator, same posterior distribution...). We pro-
pose to define the concepts of “At random”, “R-ignorable” and “Informative” in a statistical
framework that is even more general than the “X = x(T,T [Y ],Z)“ model of Section 3. The
“X = x(T,T [Y ],Z)“ model will only be used to illustrate these definitions and to establish
the connections with existing definitions that were given in restricted frameworks that fit in
the “X = x(T,T [Y ],Z)“ model.
4.1. General statistical framework
Consider a statistical model {(Ω,SΩ, P )}P ∈P , where Ω is a set, SΩ is a sigmafield on Ω and
P is a set of family distributions on the measured space (Ω,SΩ). Consider three random
variables IdΩ, X ∶ (Ω,SΩ) → (X ,SX ), the observed statistic (e.g. the variable that the
statistician will observe), and V ∶ (Ω,SΩ) → (V ,SV ), that can be latent, or not. A non
latent variable being defined as any V variable such that V ≺ X . Let SP be a sigmafield
on P and let Q = {Q ∈ Q} be a set of probatility measures on (P,SP), called prior
distributions. Let V¯ be a (non necessarily distinct) complement of V , that can be latent
or not. Since (V, V¯ ) ⊵ Ω, ∃x ∶ (V (Ω) × V¯ (Ω)) such that X = x(V, V¯ ), x is given by the
relationship: x =X[⊓V,V¯ ].
Examples 12. In the “X = x(T,T [Y ],Z)” model: 1. IdΩ = (T,Y,Z). 2. When T is a
selection, the random variable V¯ can be an image of Z, (for example D, or Π), or an image
of T (for example I, J R ...) a function of Y ...etc. The question can we ignore V¯ is then
equivalent to can we ignore the transformation process (V¯ = T ) ? the inclusion probabilities
(V¯ = Π) ? both the inclusion probabilities and the transformation (V¯ = (Π, T ) ? anything but
the values of the signal and the design variable on the sample (V = (Yk,Zk)k∈U)?
Examples 13 (Complements of V ). In the model X = x(T,T [Y ],Z), 1. if V = T ,
then a complement is V¯ = (Y,Z). 2. if V = Z, then a complement is V¯ = (Y,T ). 3. if
V = T [Y ] = Y [R], a natural complement may be (U,Y ∣[U∖image[R]],R,T ),
In the following, V¯ , will be called the nuisance process and V will be the process of interest.
Following Rubin (1976), we propose to define what it means to ”ignore V¯ in this section.
4.2. Transformations induced by the ignoring of a random process
We assume that the sigmafield SV (Ω) contains all the elements {v} for v ∈ V (Ω), and such
that the sigmafield SV¯ contains all the elements of the form V¯ (A) for A ∈SΩ.
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4.2.1. Transformation of the model
Ignoring V¯ means that one also ignores its probability distribution, and there are different
ways to do it. A first way would be to consider V¯ as a fixed (non random) process. A second
way would be to replace its distribution given by the model by any distribution. It does not
really matter as the choice of the distribution of V¯ should not have an impact after V¯ is
ignored in the inference. Let P ′ be the set of possible distributions of V¯ after ignoring the
process.
Examples 14. 1. Considering that V¯ is fixed is equivalent to chosing:
P ′ = {Diracv¯ ∣ v¯ ∈ V¯ (Ω)} 2. Considering that the distribution of V¯ does not matter is
equivalent of chosing P ′ = {P ′}, with P ′ an arbitrary distribution on V¯ (Ω). 3. It is also
possible to define P ′ = {P V ∣ P ∈ P}.
More importantly, the second step when ignoring V¯ is to cut all stochastic dependence
between V and V¯ . It may not be possible to consider the two processes as totally independent,
especially when image(V, V¯ ) ≠ image(V ) × image(V¯ ).
Definition 10 (Transforming a model to ignore a process). For v ∈ V (Ω), define the
measurable set
Φv,V,V¯ = V¯ −1 (V¯ (V −1 ({v}))) .
If (V, V¯ ) Ü Ω, then ∀v¯ ∈ V¯ (Ω), Φv¯,V¯ ,V = Ω, and ∶ ω ↦ (⊓V¯ ,V ) (v¯, V (ω)) is measurable∶ (Ω,SΩ)→ (Ω,SΩ).
If ∀P ∈ P, ∀v¯ ∈ V¯ (Ω), P (Φv¯,V¯ ,V ) > 0, define:
P
⋆ = {(⟨ v¯ ↦ P (V,v¯)∣Φv¯,V¯ ,V ∣P ′⟩(V,V¯ )(Ω),V¯ (Ω))⊓V,V¯ ∣ (P,P ′) ∈ P ×P ′} .
The model obtained after ignoring V¯ is the model(codomain(X),Scodomain(X),{(P ⋆)X ∣ P ⋆ ∈ P⋆}).
Example 15. When P ′ = {Diracv¯ ∣ v¯ ∈ V¯ (Ω)}, this definition is the generalisation of the
concept of ”ignoring the process that causes missing data” from (Rubin, 1976, Sec. 6, p. 585).
Indeed, Rubin explains that when the nuisance process, equivalent to the missing data indi-
cator, it can be considered as a fixed variable.
Example 16. Fixed population model for design based inference is the model obtained
after ignoring the population generation and the design variable generation (V¯ = (Y,Z)) and
chosing P ′ = {Dirac ∣ (y, z) ∈ (Y,Z)(Ω)}.
Ignoring a process V¯ is in general different from marginilising on V¯ (which consists in only
considering P V ) or conditioning on V¯ (which consists in only considering P V ∣V¯ , ignoring a
process is about changing the model to suppress stochastic relations between V and V¯ as
much as possible. When conditioning, one assumes that V is observed. Rubin (1976) gives
conditions on the missing data process so that it can be ignored, e.g. conditions under which
conditioning and ignoring lead to the same inference.
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There is another way to ignore a nuisance process, without having to consider it as a
parameter, which consists in considering that ∀v, v ↦ P V¯ ∣V =v = P V¯ ∣Φv,V,V¯ . This last approach
is equivalent to chosing P ′ = {P V¯ ∣ P ∈ P}, and if in addition, (V, V¯ ) Ü Ω), this is equivalent
of chosing P⋆ = {(P V ⊗ (P ′)V¯ )⊓V,V¯ ∣ P,P ′ ∈ P}.
Property 2. If (V, V¯ ) Ü Ω, and P ′ = {P V¯ ∣ P ∈ P}, then P⋆ = {(P V ⊗ P V¯ )⊓V,V¯ ∶ P ∈ P}.
4.2.2. Transformation of the target of the inference
We have seen that ignoring a random process consists in changing the family of probability
distributions of the model. The object of the inference can be a function defined on the initial
model. To completely describe what ignoring the model is, one needs to specify what is the
new object of inference after ignoring the model. The target of the inference is any function
θ ∶ (P ×Ω)→. For example, when θ ≺ ((P,ω)↦ P ), θ is a parameter and the object of the
inference is estimation, whereas when θ ≺ ((P,ω) ↦ Y (ω)), θ is a function of Y to predict
and the object of the inference is prediction. Given a target θ, what is the corresponding
target θ⋆ in the model P⋆ ? There is a natural answer in the following cases.
1. If there exists Y ∶ (Ω,SΩ)→ such that θ ∶ (Ω×P) →, (ω,P )↦ Y (ω), a natural choice
is θ⋆ ∶ P⋆ ×Ω →, (P ⋆, ω)↦ (P ⋆, ω)↦ Y (ω).
2. If there exists Y ∶ (Ω,SΩ) → such that θ ≺ (P,ω ↦ P Y ): θ = θ′ ○ (P ↦ P Y ) and if{(P ⋆)Y ∣ P ⋆ ∈ P⋆} ⊂ codomain(θ′), then one may define: θ⋆ ∶ P ⋆ ↦ θ′((P ⋆)Y ).
3. When P⋆ ⊂ P, a natural choice is θ⋆ = θ∣
P⋆×Ω.
4.2.3. Transformation of the set of prior distributions
Switching from P to P⋆ after ignoring one process, makes it difficult to define a new set
of prior distributions Q⋆ because Q and Q⋆ are not distributions defined on the same set.
When each prior distribution is the product of a prior on the process of interest and a prior
on the nuisance process, a natural choice for the new set of prior distributions on the new
model can be made.
The natural way to define a new set of prior distributions is to proceed this way:
1. Define a set Q˜ of prior (not necessarily proper) distributions on P ′. 2. Define
Q⋆ =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
(QP↦(v¯↦P (V,v¯)∣Φv¯,V¯ ,V ) ⊗Q′)
(P ′′,P ′)↦((⟨P ′′∣P ′⟩(V,V¯ )(Ω),V¯ (Ω))
⊓
V,V¯ )
∶ Q ∈ Q,Q′ ∈ Q′
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎪⎭
.
Example 17. When P ′ = {Diracv¯ ∶ v¯ ∈ V¯ (Ω)}, define (∫ P V¯ dQ(P ))Dirac as the measure
on P ′: (∫ PdQ(P )) = (V¯ (SΩ)→,A ↦ ∫P P V¯ (A)dQ(P ))v¯↦Diracv¯ . A possible choice for the
set of prior distbution on P ′ is
Q
′ = {Q′′ ∶ Q′ << (∫ P V¯ dQ(P ))Dirac and Q′ >> (∫ P V¯ dQ(P ))Dirac ,Q ∈ Q} .
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4.2.4. Transformation of the dominant measure
The model P may be dominated by a σ-finite measure ζ used to define the likelihood for
example. When P ′ = {Diracv¯ ∣ v¯ ∈ V¯ (Ω)}, the model {PX ∣ P ∈ P⋆} is dominated by the
measure (ζV ⊗ µV¯ (Ω))X[⊓V,V¯ ], where µV¯ (Ω) is the counting measure on V¯ (Ω). This dominant
measure is not necessarily σ-finite.
4.3. Equivalent inferences
Comparing the inference before and after ignoring the model is relevant when the two in-
ferences are of the same nature. The only thing that the model after ignoring a selection
mechanism and the model before have in common is the probability space (Ω,SΩ) and
the random variables defined on it. No matter what type of inference (Bayesian inference,
maximum likelihood estimation in a frequentist framework, testing, model choice), inference
always comes down to studying the properties of some random quantities for specific sets of
probability distributions and prior probability distributions.
4.3.1. Likelihood based inference.
The likelihood based inference on θ ∶ P → is equivalent to the likelihood based infer-
ence on θ⋆ ∶ P⋆ → when X = x if codomain(θ) = codomain(θ⋆) and ∃ α ∈ R+ such that
(θ ↦L ⋆
θ
⋆;X
(θ;x)) = (θ ↦ α Lθ,X (θ;x)).
4.3.2. Estimation in the frequentist framework
The inference based on the estimation of θ ∶ P → by θˆ ∶ Ω → codomain(θ) is equivalent
to the estimation of θ⋆ ∶ P → by θˆ if codomainθ = codomainθ⋆ and ∀θ ∈ codomain(θ),{P θˆ ∣ P ∈ θ−1(θ)} = {(P ⋆)θˆ ∣ (P ⋆) ∈ (θ⋆)−1(θ)}.
4.3.3. Bayesian inference.
The Bayesian inference on θ ∶ (P ×Ω) → with the set of prior distribution Q is equivalent to
the likelihood based inference on θ⋆ ∶ (P⋆ ×Ω)→ with the set of prior distribution Q when
X = x if {(Q⋆)θ⋆∣X=x ∣ Q⋆ ∈ Q⋆} = {Qθ∣X=x ∣ Q ∈ Q}
5. Ignorable vs. Informative Process: Definition and
Characterisation
5.1. Definition
The process V¯ will be called ignorable for a specific type
of inference if for P ′ = {Diracv¯ ∶ v¯ ∈ V¯ (Ω))}, and Q′ =
{Q′′ ∶ Q′ << (∫ P V¯ dQ(P ))Dirac and Q′ >> (∫ P V¯ dQ(P ))Dirac ,Q ∈ Q} for which
this type of inference based on (P,θ,L ,Q, ...) is equivalent to the same type of inference
based on (P⋆,θ⋆,L ⋆,Q⋆, ...). In the case they are not equivalent, the process V¯ will be
called informative.
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Examples 18. 1. In the X = x(T [Y ], T,Z) Assume that X = T [Y ], that Y follows a pop-
ulation model, and that T is a selection without replacement. The population model is that(Y [k])k∈U are iid realisations of some distribution, and the goal is to estimate θ = E[Y [1]].
If ∀P ∈ P, PZ,T,Y = PZ,T ⊗ P Y , then the selection and the design variables are not infor-
mative. 2. If we assume that selection can be with replacement, then the selection and the
design variables are informative.
6. Discussion
This section is a draft that gives an idea of the topics we would like to discuss in the final
version.
6.1. Ignorability and Ancillarity, Informativeness and information
Consider the following example: Assume Y ∣ n ∼ Bernoulli(θ,1)⊗n, (n − 1) ∼ Binomial(θ,N).
The inference consists in estimating θ. The theory tells us that the best estimator is a
affine combinaison of (n − 1)/N and the average of Y . And this statistic contains all the
information about θ. Should n be ignored ? no. Can n be ignored ? yes if the statistician
has chosen to use the average of Y only. The average of Y has the same distribution in the
model where n is not ignored, and in the model where n is ignored. Is n informative ? yes,
if we consider that informative means: contains additional information on the parameter of
interest, with respect to the information contained in Y /n. No if we consider that informative
means: contains information that will condition the distribution of Y /n.
The choice of the term informative selection seems to have appeared for the first time
in Scott (1975), it was a reference to design for which any prior would have no effect on
the posterior distribution of the parameters of distribution of the process of interest: it was
clearly stated for a joint model on the nuisance and interest processes was separated in to
a nuisance process model and a study process model, which excludes the case considered
above.
At first sight, it seems that an easy answer would be to consider a sufficient statistic in the
original model with respect to θ, and require that the distribution of the sufficient statistic is
the same in the orignal model and in the ignored model. This raises the problem of defining
sufficient and ancillary statistics in presence of nuisance parameters. So it seemed wise to
separate the question about what information could be used from the question about doing
a correct inference. Another aspect about sufficient statistic and ancillary statistic is that
those notions only apply to non latent processes, whereas the nuisance process is also latent.
6.2. Sufficient conditions for ignorable transformation
In this section we will illustrate the sufficient conditions for ignorable transformation on real
life examples. As mentioned, independence of the transformation process and the process of
interest are not necessarily sufficient to ensure ignorability.
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6.3. Testing ignorability vs informativeness of a process
In this subsection we propose to give sufficient conditions for informativeness.
6.4. On the question of weighting or not weighting
The question of using the samplign weights has been treated by numerous authors. Without
narrowing too much the debate, we consider the case where T is a selection and where
X = x(T [Y ], T,Z) = (T [Y ], T [π], h(Z)): we observe the values of Y on the sample, the
values of the inclusion probabilities on the sample, as well as some information derived from
the design variable (which can be the strata for the whole population, the list of units in the
population, ...etc).
There are different ways of using or not using the weights and different environments: 1. ig-
nore the weights, and use a model where selection and weights are non informative, 2. ig-
nore the weights, because auxiliary information is available (for example the design and
design variables on the population) and contains already the information brought by the
weights, 3. use the weights and T [Y ] and discard the information brought by all other
auxiliary information..
We can remark that the questions of using or not using the weights is linked to the
two distinct following questions: Can we ignore the selection ? Do the weights bear any
information that should be used ?
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Supplemented Materials
We took some notes on different papers that deal with sufficiency, partial sufficiency,
ignorability, and informative selection, that we reproduce below. These notes can be useful
for the reader, but are not necessary for the comprehension of the paper.
Appendix A: Remarks and notes on set theory
A.1. On the ambiguity of “dependence”.
The statement “h ∶ (x1, x2, x3, x4)↦ (x1 + x3) depends only of h′ ∶ (x1, x2, x3, x4)→ (x1, x3)”
means that there exists a function g such that h = g○h′. The statement “h ∶ (x1, x2, x3)↦ (x1+
x3) does depends on h′ ∶ (x1, x2, x3, x4)→ (x3)” means that the value of h is not necessarily
the same for all x3, all other things being equal, e.g. (x1, x2, x4) = (x′1, x′2, x′4) ⇎ h(x) =
h(x′). The statement “h ∶ (x1, x2, x3) ↦ (x1 + x3) does not depend on h′ ∶ (x1, x2, x3, x4) →(x2)” means that the value of h is the same for all x2, all other things being equal, e.g.(x1, x3, x4) = (x′1, x′3, x′4)⇔ h(x) = h(x′). There is an ambiguity in the definition of ”depends
on” that comes from the difficulty to give a mathematical meaning to the expression ”all
other things being equal”. Consider the statement h ∶ (x1, x2, x3)↦ (x1+x3) does not depend
on (x1, x2, x3)→ x2. This statement is ambiguous because the codomain of the two functions
are not specified. If the codomain is R3, the statement is not ambiguous: the function h
depends only on h′ ∶ (x1, x2, x3) ↦ (x1, x3), which is a variation independent complement of
h. If the domain is E ∶ {(x1, x2, x3) ∈ R3 ∣ x1 = x2, then in this case, h ∶ E →, (x1, x2, x3) ↦(x1+x3) =∶ E →, (x1, x2, x3)↦ (x2+x3). So even if there is a formal independence in (x1+x3),
when applied to functions, it is ambiguous, as the domain of h may be the outcome of some
constraining that link x1 and x2. The conclusion is that independence is with respect to a
complete reparametrisation of the parameter, h does not depend of h′ has a meaning when it
is understood as h depends only of h¯
′
where h¯
′
is a complement of h′ that has been specified.
In the case where E ∶ {(x1, x2, x3) ∈ R3 ∣ x1 = x2, IdE , x↦ (x1, x3) and x↦ (x3) are in As we
have seen, there always exist a complement, although it is not a distinct complement. When
we say h ∶ (x1, x2, x3) ↦ (x1 + x3) does not depend on (x1, x2, x3) → x2 all other parameters
being equal, we implicitely fix x1 and x3 and check that for every possible x2, x′2 such that{(x1, x2, x3), (x1, x′2, x3)} ∈ E , h(x1, x2, x3) = h(x1, x′2, x3). But it should be avoided and the
use of “depends only” should be preferred, the natural definition of h is independent of h′
when h¯ is fixed is the following.
Definition 11. h ∶ E → is deterministically independent of h′ ∶ E → when h¯′ is fixed if and
only if any of the following statement is true: 1. ∀x,x′ ∈ E , h¯′(x) = h¯′(x′)⇒ h(x) = h(x′), 2. h
depends only on h¯
′
, 3. ∃g ∶→ such that h = g ○ h¯′.
When we deal with nuisance parameters, nothing prevents to link the nuisance process to
the process of interest by saying that the same parameter governs them, as for example in
cutoff sampling. The parameter space is not the product of the two parameters spaces and
still we may want to be able to apply the definition of informative or non informative process
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to this case. It is then necessary to be clear about this statement “the likelihood does not
depend on the nuisance parameter”.
Property 3 (Variation independence). Given two functions h,h′ ∶ E →,
the following statements are equivalent: 1. h and h′ are variation indepen-
dent, 2. image(h,h′) = image(h) × image(h′). 3. ∀y ∈ image(h), y′ ∈ image(h′), ∃x ∈ E such
that h(x) = y and h′(x) = y′. 4. ∀y ∈ image(h′), image(h∣
h′−1({y})) = image(h).
Appendix B: Notes on selected work on the definition
of information, sufficiency, in particular
in presence of nuisance parameters
B.1. Conditional distributions
Property-Definition 12 (Transition probabilities). (see Sverdrup (1966, p. 310)) Con-
sider a measured space (Ω,S, P ), and a subsigmafield S′ of S, then define the conditional
probability of A given ”the most accurate description of y by means of statements from
S′ as the value un (A,ω) of the function: S × Ω → [0.1], (A,ω) ↦ P (A ∣ SY , ω), which
P (A ∣ SY , .) ∶ Ω → [0,1], ω ↦ P (A ∣ SY , ω) is the class of almost unique S′-measurable
functions of ω which satisfies [∀B ∈ S′], P (A ∩ B) = ∫B P (A ∣ S′, ω)dP (ω). The function
P (A ∣S′, .) does always exist and is almost uniquely defined.
B.1.1. Conditions for existence of conditional distributions.
One could have assumed that the measurable space (Ω,SΩ) satisfies the regular
conditional probability property (this assumed property conveniently states that
all conditional probabilities are defined). As Dieudonne´ (1948) mentions, it is
only available for certain distributions. So this assumption is not convenient
there. For more reading on regular conditional probability, one can look at
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Regular_conditional_probability, but for academic
references, some are listed here: https://scielo.conicyt.cl/pdf/proy/v23n1/art02.pdf,
which includes Kolmogorov (1933, in german) and Dieudonne´ (1948), the paper is in french
but the notion is not the main topic, it is lost in chapter 7. So it seemed reasonable here
to just say: Assume that all given conditional distributions are defined, without adding
unnecessary refinment.
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B.2. Densities
“3. Conditional probabilities and expectations. Lemma 4. If µ and ν aremeasures on S such that ν ≪ µ, then νT −1 ≪ µT −1.
Proof. If F ∈ T and 0 = µT −1(F ) = µ(T −1(F )), then
0 = ν(T −1(F ) = νT −1(F ).
Lemma 4. is the basis of the definition of a concept of great importance in probabil-
ity theory. If µ is a measure on S and f is a non negative integrable function on X ,
then the measure ν defined by dν = fdµ is absolutely continuous with respect to µ.
It follows from Lemma 4 that νT −1 is absolutely continuous with respect to µT −1;
we write dνT −1 = gdµT −1. The function value g(y) is known as the conditional
expectation of f given y (or given T (x) = y)
”Halmos & Savage (1949, p. 229, )
Let (V, V¯ ) be a separation of Ω, then (P V ⊗ P V¯ )⊓V,V¯ is a measure on Ω that may differ
from P = (P (V,V¯ ))⊓V,V¯ , even when (V, V¯ ) is a distinct separation of Ω. For example, if
P = Normal(0,(1 ρ
ρ 1
)), with ρ ≠ 0, V =X1 ∶ (x1, x2)↦ x1, V¯ =X2 ∶ (x1, x2)↦ x1, ⊓ = IdR2 .
Let f be a density of P with respect to ζ and fV a density of P V with respect to ζV .
If P ≪ ζ , then P V ≪ ζV ((See Halmos & Savage, 1949, p. 229, Sec. 3)). The relationship
between dP /dζ and dP V /dζV is as follows: ∀h measurable ∫V (Ω) h dP V = ∫Ω h ○ V dP =∫Ω h○V d(f.ζ) = ∫Ω f.h○V dζ = ∫V (Ω) fV .h dζV . In the case where V is a C(1) diffeomorphism
and that the measurable spaces involved are subsets of Rn. The change of variable formula
gives a relationship between f and fV .
B.3. Sufficient statistic
For sufficient statistics with respect to θ, without nuisance parameters details can be found
in the following books: Lehmann & Casella (n.d.),Loeve (n.d.) and Sverdrup (1967). Three
things are important to be able to define sufficient statistics: 1. The definition consist on a
property satisfied by some transition probabilities, which means that they must be defined,
and there exists a list of conditions for transition probabilities to be defined and to be
probabilities. 2. The definition of a sufficient subsigmafield. 3. The definition of a sufficient
statistic.
1. Definition of transition probabilities for a probability space (Ω,SΩ, P ) wrt a sub-
sigmafield B of SΩ. Sverdrup (1967, Vol. 2, Sec. D.5, p. 306), Lehmann & Casella
(n.d.).Below are some essential elements about transition probabilities
(a) Existence of transition probabilities is a consequence of the Radon Nikodym the-
orem.
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(b) The result can be extended to measures.
(c) Assumptions may be added to get 3 nice conditions satisfied by the transition
probabilities, one needs additional assumption: the spaces must be euclidean.
This is explained in Sverdrup (1967, Vol. 2, Sec. D.5, p. 306), Lehmann & Casella
(n.d.). The three nice properties are as follows:
(d) transition probabilities are B measurables (into [0,1],B[0,1], defined by
∀A ∈SΩ, P (A ∣ B, .) ∶ ω ↦ P (A ∣ B, ω),
such that ∀B ∈ B,
P (B ∩A) = ∫
B
P (A ∣ B, ω)dP (ω).
(e) transition probabilities are all defined P -a.s. andB measurables. which means that
if one takes two representants of the class, the difference is also A0 measurable.
The set where they differ is the reciprocal image of 0 by the difference so it is an
element of B of measure 0.
(f) when working on euclidean spaces with sigmafields being Borel fields, with den-
sities, and when B =S(Y ), conditional density can be derived.
(g) Although it has no meaning at this stage(when conditional distributions have not
been defined, Define the equivalence relation ω ∼B ω′ ↔ [∀B ∈ B, [t ∈ B ↔ t′ ∈
B]]. Then
P (A ∣ B, ω) = ∫
class∼B(ω)
1A dP
Id∣class∼B=class∼B(ω).
One can see that P (A ∣ B, .) is necessarily constant on each class∼B(ω). The
problem is that the measures P Id∣class∼B=class∼B(ω) are not necessarily defined unless
P (class∼B(ω)) > 0, and at this stage, have no meaning as conditional probabilities
were not defined.
(h) once the existence of the transition probabilities up P-a.s. equivalence is proven,
the conditional expectation of a random variable X is defined as a B measur-
able random variable, defined up to a equivalence relationship, such that ∀f ,
integrable[...] E[f(X)] = ∫ f(E[X ∣ B])dP . (although one understands it better
when written like this:)
E[X ∣ B] = class(∶ Ω →, ω ↦ ∫
class∼B(t)
X dP Id∣class∼B=class∼B(ω))
2. Definition of a sufficient subsigmafield for a set of probability distributions.
• Definition of sufficiency does not require domination of the model.
• Many books use a parametric dominated model. Loeve (n.d., p. 344) does not use
a parametric model, but a dominated one. He is defining a sufficient sigmafield
wrt a set of measures (not necessarily probability measures.
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• more generally, sufficient statistic consist in saying that forall A ∈SΩ, there exists
ΨA such that classes of transition probabilities (P (A ∣ B, .) all contain ΨA,There
is a difficulty there because the class of transition probabilities for P,A is the class
wrt P − a.s equality, whereas the class of transition probabilities for P ′,A is the
class wrt P ′ − a.s equality. Let take a representent ΨA,P ∈ (P (A ∣ B, .) for each
P . Then define BP = (ΨA − ΨA,P )−1({0}). So BP ∈ A for each P , and for each
P P (BP ) = 0. We do not necessarily have P ′(BP ) = 0. For example: Ω = {0,1},
B = A = Subsets(Ω), P = {δ0, δ1}, ΨA = δA.
• Note that Loeve (n.d., p. 344) definition is the definition of a sufficient sub sigma
field for a family of random variables defined on the same measured space. For
each of these random variables Zt ∶ (Ω,SΩ, µ) → (R+,BR+)?, Loeves denotes by
µt the indefinite integrals of Xt. (see p. 129 for defintiion of indefinite integrals),µt
is the measure ∶ A ↦ ∫AXt dµ. So µt in that case are all continuous wrt µ, and Xt
is a density of µt wrt µ. Xt are supposed to be positive and integrable.
Definition 13 (Sufficient statistic). A sufficient statistic (Sverdrup (1966)[p. 310]) is a
random variable S ∶ (Ω,SΩ)→ such that
∀A ∈SΩ, ∃ΦA ∶ (Ω,S(S))→ ([0,1],Borel[0,1]) such that ∀P ∈ P, P -a.s.(ω), ΦA(ω) = P (A ∣S(S), ω).
(3)
Remark 3. Condition (3) is almost equivalent to
∀A ∈SX , (∶ P →, P ↦ P (A ∣S(S), .)) ≺ (1P).
It is almost equivalent and not equivalent because of the almost sure equality between ΦA
and the conditional distributions derived from the distributions of the model. If we consider
that P (A ∣S(S), .) is one representative of the class and not the whole class, in a dominated
context, the equivalence holds. In a non dominated context, the equivalence does not hold.
So Condition (3) is weaker than Condition (3).
B.4. Inference in presence of nuisance parameters. Specific and
partial sufficiency.
In the current section, we will give some quotes from some papers that deal with the definition
of specific and partial sufficiency or ancillarity in presence of nuisance parameters. We start
with giving all the definitions in our notations.
B.4.1. Definitions and comments in the current paper notations
In our notation, the Fraser (1956, Eq. (1)) Definition is equivalent to the following:
Definition 14 (Specific sufficiency). Consider the statistical model (Ω,SΩ,P). Let θ ∶
P →, and let θ¯ be a complement of θ . The random variable S ∶ (Ω,SΩ) →. is a (θ, θ¯)-
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specific sufficient statistic if and only if:
(∶ P →, P ↦ P S) ≺ θ, (4)
(∶ P →, P ↦ (∶SΩ ×Ω→, (A,ω) ↦ P (A ∣S(S), ω))) ≺ θ¯, (5)
and (θ, θ¯) Ü P. (6)
There are three conditions: (Eq. (4)) P S depends only on θ,(Eq. (5)) the conditional
distribution of IdΩ given S depends only on θ¯, and (Eq. (6)) θ is a distinct complement of
θ¯) Ü P. We can see it is a generalisation of the definition of a sufficient statistic by choosing
θ = IdP , θ¯ = 1P . Heuristically them A (θ, θ¯)-specific sufficient statistic is a statistic that
(Eq. (4)) contains no information about θ¯(P ) but the one already included in θ(P ) , such
that (Eq. (5)) P IdΩ∣S contains no information about θ(P ) but the one already included in
θ¯(P ) , and such that (Eq. (6)) θ contains no information about θ¯ and vice versa.. In the
case where θ = IdP , θ¯ = 1P , the two first and third conditions are always true. Other ways
to generalize the definition of sufficient statistic would have been not to include first or third
condition or both, which would have insured the existence of a sufficient statistic. If we
drop the condition that (θ, θ¯) Ü P, the previous definition still makes sense, but it does
not correspond to the definition as proposed by Fraser (1956). It is important to note that
in Fraser (1956) definition though, to define a θ-sufficient statistic, one needs to specify η,
the distinct complement of θ. It is important to say that if θ, θ¯ Ü P, for any h ∶ θ¯(P) →
bijective, necessarily, θ, h ○ θ¯ Ü P. So when (θ, θ¯) Ü P, in that sense, specifying θ¯ does not
matter.
Having to impose the condition that (θ, θ¯) Ü P has drawbacks: Consider for example the
model (N2,BorelN2 ,{Poisson(λ1) ⊗Poisson(λ2) ∣ λ1 < λ2}). With IdΩ = (V1, V2), just because
the parameter space is not separated, one just cannot say that V1 is specific sufficient for λ2,
one needs to take the precaution of plundging the parameter space in a separated one first,
then apply the definition, or test the different conditions one by one and report on each of
them. If one drops the condition (θ, θ¯) Ü P, then one can always take (θ ∶ P →, P ↦ P S)
and θ¯ ∶ P →, P ↦ (∶SΩ ×Ω →, (A,ω) ↦ P (A ∣S(S), ω)) and then θθ⊥ θ¯ θ¯ and say that S is
a (θ, θ¯)-specific sufficient statistic.
B.4.2. Fisher 1922
Fisher (1922) gives definitions of sufficiency in two
places First he gives the following heuristic definition:
“A statistic satisfies the criterion of sufficiency when no other statistic which canbe calculated from the same sample provides any additional information as to the
value of the parameter to be estimated.
”Fisher (1922, p. 310)
Then he adds a more mathematical definition.
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“ [...] In mathematical language we may interpret [the] statement[: “the statisticchosen should summrise the whole of the relevant information supplied by the
sample”] by saying that if θ be the parameter to be estimated, [X1[ a statistic
which contains the whole of the information as to the value of θ, which the sample
supplies, and [X2] any other statistic, then the surface of the distribution of pairs
for values of [X1] and [X2] for a given value of θ, is such that for a given value of
θ, the distribution of [X2] does not involve θ. In other words, when [X1] is known,
knwoledge of the value of [X2] throws no further light upon the value of θ.
”Fisher (1922, p. 316)
Ambiguity is that Fisher did not talk about the complement of θ, and more discussion
needs to be given about the parameter space, but right in the beginning, the definition about
a sufficient statistic seemed to be the definition of a specific sufficient statistic.
B.4.3. Fisher (1934) Two new properties of mathematical likelihood.
Fisher (1934)
B.4.4. Neyman Pearson 1936
Neyman & Pearson (1936)
This paper acknowledges for the need ot theory of functions:
“ it is inevitable, [...] that a paper dealing with [the] problem [of what conclusionsregarding sufficient statistics may be drawn from the existence of uniformly most
powerful tests, or vice versa] should bear some mark of the theory of functions, in
spite of its concern with statistical questions
”Neyman & Pearson (1936, p. 240)
In this paper, the model is parametrized by n parameters, but there is no discussion
about the joint space of those parameters. It is implicit in the paper that all conditional
probabilities, densities are defined. The author say they are not concerned about sufficiency
for estimation, but for decision. They recall the results of Fisher linking sufficient statistics
and uniformly most powerful tests. Then they say this:
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“In treating [the] problem of [the use of sufficient statistics with heir bearing onthe theory of testing statistical hypotheses], we have found it necessary to use not
only the conception of sufficient statistics as introduced by R.A. Fisher, but to
introduce also some new conceptions which, as far as we are aware, have not been
considered before, namely the conceptions of a sufficient set of statistics and of a
shared sufficient statistic. [...]. We believe that our definition of a “specific sufficient
statistic” corresponds to Fisher’s conception of a sufficient statistic, but thought
he has written on sufficient statistics in several places the definitions he has given
appearm in our opinion, to leave some room for misunderstanding.
”Neyman & Pearson (1936, p. 243)
The authors refer to the paper [Fisher (1922)] and copy his defi-
nitions of sufficiency. Then Neyman & Pearson (1936) define a statistic.
“4. Definitions and properties of sufficient statistics.[...]
Definition I. If a function T , or random variables x1, . . . , xn possesses the following
properties:
a) T is defined and single valued at almost every point of the sample space W ,
b) whatever be a number T ′, the locus of points in the sample space un which
T < T ′ is such that the probbility law of the x′s may be integrated over it,
giving the probability P ({T < T ′}),*
c) there exist such values, T ′, that the locus of points, W (T ′, in which T = T ′
is of at least (n − 1) dimensions, i.e. one less than the number of dimensions
of the sample space W ,
d) T does not depend upon any unknown parameters which may be involved in
the probability law,
then it will be called a statistic
”Neyman & Pearson (1936, p. 243)
They comment on that definition, and then define a sufficient statistic:
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“Definition II. The statistic T is called a specific sufficient statistic with regard tothe parameter θ1 if, whatever other statistic T2 be taken, the relative probability
law P (T2 ∣ T1) of T2, given T1 is independent of θ1. This we believe to correspond
with Fisher’s original definition of a sufficient statistic. We have added the adjective
“specific” for convenience in comparison.
”Neyman & Pearson (1936, p. 246)
It is interesting to note that Neyman & Pearson (1936) only retain one condition for a
statistic to be sufficient, contrary to the later definition of Fraser (1956) for example. Note
that the definition is still imprecise, because of the ambiguity on the term independence and
the lack of discussion on the parameter space. The rest of the parameter defines a share
sufficient statistic (when T1, ..., Tn is a specific sufficient statistic. In their setup, they have
a multidimensional parameter, but they have no assumption on the parameter space. Their
definition is thus imprecise as they use the term ”depend on“ and we have seen that this is
ambiguous.
Definition 15 (Shared sufficient statistic). The statistic T1 is called a shared sufficient
statistic of the parameter θ1, . . . , θq if, whatever other statistic T2 be taken, the relative prob-
ability law of T2 given T1 is independent of these q pqrqmeters, while it depends on the
remaining l − q parameters θq+1, . . . , θl.
Neyman & Pearson (1936, p. 247, Sec. 4, Proposition I) characterize specific sufficiency by
givin a necessary and sufficient condition on the likelihood, which looks like the factorisation
theorem.
“Proposition I. The necessary and sufficient condition for a statistic T to be specif-ically sufficient with regard to a parameter θ (in the case of Definition II) is that
in any point of the sample space (as defined on p.117), except perhaps fo a set of
measure zero, it should be possible to present the probability law of the x′s in the
form of the product
p(x1, . . . xn ∣ θ) = p(T ∣ θ)φ(x1, . . . xn) ∣T=T (x1,...,xn),
, where p(T ∣ θ) denotes the probability law of T , and φ is a function of the x′s
independent on θ.
”Neyman & Pearson (1936, p. 246)
By writing p(T ∣ θ) they seem to implicitely require that the distribution of T only depends
on θ, which is in contradiction with their Definition II.
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B.4.5. Blackwell (1947), Conditional expectation and unbiased sequential estimation
This early paper is important, as one of the importance of identifying the sufficient statistics,
is to be able to only base the information on the sufficient statistic,
“It is shown that E[f(x)E[y ∣ x]] = E(fy) whenever E(fy) is finite, and thatσ2E(y ∣ x) ≤ σ2y, where E(y ∣ x) denotes the conditional expectation of y with
respect to x. These results imply that whenever there is a sufficient statitic u and
an unbiased estimate t, not a function of u only, for a parameter θ, the function
E(t ∣ u), which is a function of u only, is an unbiased estimate for θ with a variance
smaller than that of t.
”Blackwell (1947, p. 105)
B.4.6. Halmos & Savage (1949). Application of the Radon-Nikodym theorem to the theory
of sufficient statistic
Halmos & Savage (1949) show how in a dominated model, after applying the Radon Nikodym
theorem, one can deduce sufficiency from the densities (factorisation). The result was already
stated in Neyman & Pearson (1936, p. 247, Sec. 4, Proposition I), Halmos & Savage (1949)
provide a very general result, by using Radon-Nikodym theorem. Nevertheless, they do not
mention specific sufficiency, only sufficiency. to say that but This paper also discusses pairwise
sufficiency and likelihood ratio.
Section 1. starts with definitions from the theory of measure. Section 2. is about Measures
and their derivatives. The Radon-Nikodym theorem. Section 3. is about probabilities and
expectations. It contains the following lemma:
“Lemma 4.If µ and ν are measures on S such that ν << µ then νT −1 << µT −1. ”Halmos & Savage (1949, p. 229)
.
Other classical lemma are given. Section 4 is about dominated sets of measures. Lemma 7
is the one that states that every dominated set of measures has an equivalent countable
set. Section 5 is titled Sufficient statistics for dominated sets. It contains the definition of a
sufficient statistic for a set of measures on S. It does not contain a defintion of a specific
statistic. The authors develop the concept of pairwise sufficiency, which is sufficiency for
any two measures from the model. Pairwise sufficiency is weaker than sufficiency, but
equivalent in the dominated case.
B.4.7. Dinkyn (1951), Necessary and sufficient statistics for a family of probability
distributions
This paper is cited by Andersen (1967) DYNKIN, Necessary sufficient statistics family .
Vspechi Matem. Nauk (N.S.), probability Uspechi vol. 6, pp. (1-41), 68-90.
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This paper contains results about the existence of minimal sufficient a·field.
B.4.8. Fraser (1952), Sufficient statistics and selection depending on the parameter
Fraser (1952) defines what is a functional sufficient (or f-sufficient) function with respect to
a family of functions, as well as what is meant by parameter of selection. An index on the
probability measures of the model is a parameter of selection if all the measures of the model
are inductions of the same measure on subsets of the observation space.
Fraser establishes some following result, as for example:
“Lemma 3.Any sufficient statistic for a dominated set of measures M << λ is anf-sufficient statistic for an equivalent set of densities (relative to λ)
”Fraser (1952, p. 419)
I was mislead by the title. Here selection does not refer to the process of selecting units in
a population.
B.4.9. Rao (1952). Minimum variance estimation in distributions admitting ancillary
statistics.
This paper explains how to use an ancillary statistic to improve estimates.
B.4.10. Bahadur, (1954). Sufficiency and statistical decision functions
This paper is cited by Andersen (1967)
B.4.11. Basu (1955), On statistics independent of a complete sufficient statistic.
I was hoping to find in Basu (1955) the definition of an ignorable statistic, that I only found
in Schervish (1995), an ignorable statistic being a statistic independent from a sufficient
statistic. I have had a hard time to find the definition elsewhere, although I had this definition
in my lecture notes as a student. In this paper, it is not question of nuisance parameters. It
contains a theorem saying that the distribution of a statistic independent from a sufficient
statistic V for θ = IdP is necessarily the same for any P , e.g ((P ↦ P Id∣Y ) ≺ 1P and
V ⊥ Y ⇔ (P ↦ P V ≺ 1P , e.g. being independent from a sufficient statistic implies being an
ancillary statistic. If in addition Y is boundedly complete, the reciprocal is true. This paper is
important though at its generalisation in the presence of nuisance parameters was discussed
later. Note that Basu does not use the term ancillary, but independent of θ, although ancillary
was introduced by Fisher (1934), and was reused by Rao (1952).
B.4.12. Fraser 1956
Fraser (1956) Proposes a definition of sufficient statistic in presence of nuisance param-
eters. This paper does not have any assumption on the measured space (it is not nec-
essarily euclidean with Borel sigmafield). It is limited to the case where the parameter
space is of the form Θ × Θ¯, and does not consider a subset of Θ × Θ¯. The paper also
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suggest that they may not exist a specific sufficient statistic.This is mentioned in the
paper. The paper is decision theory orientated and cites nice results, which are about
testing based on a statistic sufficient wrt θ. And there is also a theorem about unbi-
ased estimator with minimum variance. The definition coincides with the one I give.
“For some of these problems a generalized definition of sufficiency can be applied. LetX be a random variable over the measurable space X (A) and let {Pθ,η ∣ (θ, η) ∈
Θ × H} be the class of possible probability measures for X . Also, let t(x) be a
statistic mapping X (A) into the measurable space I(B) and let P Tθη designate the
measure on I(B) induced by t(x) from the measure P T
θη
, over X (A). Then we
propose the following extension of the concept of sufficiency: t(x) is a sufficient
statistic (θ) for the class of measures {P Tθη ∣ (θ, η) ∈ Θ×H} if there exists a function
Pη(A ∣ t) such that
(1) Pθ,η(A ∩ t−1(B)) ≡ ∫
B
Pη(A ∣ t)dP Tθ (t)
for all A ∈ A, B ∈ B where the induced measure of t(x), P Tθ , is independent of η.
The conditional probability that X falls in the set A given t(X) = t is given by
a function which will serve as the integrand in the integral of (1). The definition
says that this conditional probability must depend only on the nuisance parameter
η, and that the marginal distribution of the statistic t(x) should depend only
on the parameter of interest θ. Thus it can be seen intuitively that the statistic
t(x) is in a general sense sufficient for problems concerning the parameter θ. For
the particular case in which there are no nuisance parameters, this defini- tion
reduces to the ordinary definition of sufficient statistic. However, there need not
exist a sufficient statistic (0), whereas there always exists a sufficient statistic by
the usual definition. Another drawback to the formulation above is the requirement
that the parameter space be a Cartesian product.
”Fraser (1956, p. 229)
(V, V¯ )-Extension and (θ, θ¯) extensions of a model
Here, we discuss why it makes sense to impose (θ, θ¯) Ü P as a necessary condition for
partial sufficiency.
First, we show how one for any random variable V , one may consider that any model
P can be ”plunged“ in another model P˚ that will lead to the same inference and such
that (P ↦ P V , P ↦ P Id∣V ) Ü P˚, we will call this extension a (V, V¯ ) extension of P, and
we explain how to move from the inference on P to the inference on P as long as the
object of the inference as a function of (P ↦ P V , P ↦ P Id∣V ) can be extended to image(P ↦
P V ) × image(P ↦ P Id∣V ) .
Given a random variable V , and a non necessarily distinct complement V¯ .Then a
(non necessarily distinct) separation of P is ((P →, P ↦ P V ),P →, P ↦ P V¯ ∣V ). We
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define the extension of P based on V and V¯ as the model (˚Ω,SΩ˚,P˚) , where Ω˚ =
Ω × {0,1}, SΩ˚ is the sigmafield SΩ × {∅,{0},{1},{0,1}} , P˚ = {P ⊗Dirac{1}∣P ∈ P} ∪{⟨P V ∣ P ′V¯ ∣V ⟩ ⊗Dirac{0}∣ (P,P ′) ∈ P, ⟨P V ∣ P ′V¯ ∣V ⟩ ∉ P} P˚ θ,θ¯. for A ∈ V (SΩ), i ∈ {0,1}, For
any statistic X ∶ (Ω,SΩ) →, define the statistic X˚ ∶ (˚Ω,SΩ˚) →, (ω, i) ↦ (X(ω), i). For any
parameter θ ∶ P →, such that θ ≺ (P →, P ↦ (P V , P V¯ ∣V )) ∃θ′ ∶→ such that θ = θ ○ (P ↦(P V , P V¯ ∣V ), and so it is possible to define the extension of θ as θ˚ = θ′○(P˚ → P ↦ (P V , P V¯ ∣V ).
The likelihood-based inference on θ given X = x with the original model will be equivalent to
the likelihood based inference on θ˚ given X˚ = (x,1). In a Bayesian framework, we also extend
the sigmafield on P to P˚ by taking any sigmafield S
P˚
on P˚ containing all elements from
SP ×{1}, and we define the set of prior distributions on P˚,SP˚ as the set Q˚ = {Q˚ ∣ Q ∈ Q},
where Q˚ is any measure on (P˚ ,S
P˚
) such that ∀A ∈SP , Q˚(A × {1}) = Q(A).
Lehmann & Romano (n.d.) General theory book Definition of sufficiency in the non dom-
inated case.
B.4.13. Rasch (1960), On general laws and the meaning of measurement meaning in
psychology
and also Rasch, – (1960). Probabilistic Models for some Intelligence and Attainment Prob-
abilistic Intelligence Attainment
This paper is cited by Andersen (1967)
B.4.14. On the foundations of statistical inference - Birnbaum (1962)
This paper does not contain many formulae, there is a lot of text. It is a deep reflexion
about certain principles in statistics. Sufficiency and Conditionality Principles are presented
there. There is a theorem that says that Sufficiency and conditionality principle implies
likelihood principles. This text is necessary to understand discussion of Dawid (1975). Note
that informative inference is used here, but not defined by opposition to another statistical
inference approach.
“Since the problem-area of informative inference has not received a generally ac-cepted delineation or terminology, it will be useful to note here some of the terms
and concepts used by writers representing several different approach
”Birnbaum (1962, p. 275)
.
Notions like informative and uniformative experiments are explained
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“Since this experiment gives the same distribution on the two-point sample spaceunder each hypothesis, it is completely uninformative, as is any outcome of this
experiment. According to the likelihood principle, we can therefore conclude that
the given likelihood function has a simple evidential interpretation, regardless of
the structure of the experiment from which it arises, namely, that it repre- sents a
completely uninformative outcome. (The same interpretation applies to a constant
likelihood function on a parameter space of any form, as an essentially similar
argument shows.)
”Birnbaum (1962, p. 291)
For the current paper objective, what we may retain from this paper is that it uses the
term informative and uninformative for experiments, not for statistics. An experiment is
uninformative when the likelihood function is the same for different values of the parameters
basically. This does not help to define an uniformative process, but it is worth mentioning that
in ”informative inference“, definition of informative experiment is based on the likelihood.
Basu (1977) will comment on this paper.
B.4.15. Barnard (1963), Some logical aspects of the fiducial argument
I read Barnard (1963) because it was cited by Dawid (1975). As its name indicates, it
contains comments about the fiducial argument (Fiducial argument is about considering
that parameters as random variables). The paper is not helpful with respect to defining
specific-informative latent process in presence of a nuisance parameter.
B.4.16. Fraser (1964), Local Conditional Sufficiency
This paper is about local conditional sufficiency. It is not mention of nuisance parameter,
and is not helpful with respect to defining specific-informative latent process in presence of
a nuisance parameter.
B.4.17. Le Cam (1964), Sufficiency and approximate sufficiency.
Ouf.
B.4.18. Sverdrup (1966), The present state of the decision theory and the Neyman-Pearson
theory
This paper contains a characterisation of the sufficiency not based on likelihood, and gives
an overview of basic mathematical definitions from probability theory.
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“The starting point is a sigmafield A of subsets [,,,] on the sample space X ofsample points x. A subsigmafield A0 of A may be of special interest. Let P (A)
be a probability measure over A . Furthermore P (A ∣ A0, x) is the conditional
probability of A given ”the most accurate description of x by means of statements
from A0“. It is defined as the almost unique A0-measurable function of x which
satisfies [∀B ∈ A0], P (A∩B) = ∫B P (A ∣ A0, x)dP . P (A ∣ A0, x) does always exist
and is almost uniquely defined[...].
Let P be a family of probability measures P for a random variableX over (X ,A ).
A subsigmafield A0 of A is sufficient for the family P if ∀A ∈ A , [∃ΦA(x) a A0
measurable function which for all P is the conditional probability relatively to A0,
i.e. for which ∀P ∈ P, ΦA(x) = P (A ∣ A0, x) a.e. (A0, P ).
We can rewrite the definition more consisely
A subsigmafield A0 of A is sufficient for the family P if
∀A ∈ A , ∃ΦA ∶ (Ω,A0)→ (R,BR), ∀P ∈ P, ΦA(x) = P (A ∣ A0, x) a.e. (A0, P ).
”Sverdrup (1966)
The paper explains that there are different definitions of sufficient statistics (p. 312). Clas-
sical, for decision, for Bayesian. Also discuss “specific sufficiency” in presence of “nuisance
parameter”. The paper Gives the definition of an ancillary statistic by Fisher, cites papers by
Basu and Rao about nuisance parameters, and explains that Fraser (1956) do things differ-
ently by requiring that the distribution of a sufficient statistic should be independent of the
nuisance parameter, which is a very restrictive property. Gives the definition of a sufficient
statistic in the general case (Eq 1. p. 313). Note that the paper redefines from the begining
conditional probabilities.
This is an important summary quote from their paper (p. 312),
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“ [Neyman & Pearson (1936)] and Fisher were talking about specific sufficiency rel-atively to a certain parameter. Let θ = (ρ, τ), where ρ is the decision parameter,
i.e. the parameter which the decision situation is concerned with, whereas τ is the
nuisance parameter. If R(x) for any given τ is minimal sufficient, then R(x)
is specifically sufficient for ρ. Suppose e.g. that X1, . . . ,Xn, are independent
normal (ξ, σ). Then X¯ is specifically sufficient for ξ. Whereas minimal sufficient
statistics exist under very general conditions, this is far from being true of specific
sufficient statistics. Thus in the example just given no specific sufficient statistic
exists for σ2. Because for any given (ξ) it is ∑(Xj − ξ)2 which is the minimal
sufficient statistic, but this is not a statistic if ξ is unknown.
It seems doubtful whether specific sufficiency in the sense taken above is an im-
portant concept in the decision theory. It is difficult to find any direct connection
between this concept and decision functions. Consider e.g. Student’s situation with
testing of θ = 0 (or constructing confidence interval for ξ). Then X¯ is specifically
sufficient, but in order to perform the testing we have to consider ∑(Xj − X¯)2.
It is of course (X¯,∑(Xj − X¯)2) which is the minimal sufficient statistic for the
model. Fisher [9] was aware of the difficulty and introduced the concept of ancil-
lary statistic. T (x) is ancillary if it jointly with the specific sufficient statistic R(x)
is minimal sufficient and the probability distribution of T (x) only depends on the
nuisance parameter τ . Rao [25] and Basu [3] have proved some interesting math-
ematical properties about ancillary statistics. A very interesting approach from a
statistical point of view, is due to [Fraser (1956)]. He does not need the concept
of ancillary statistic, instead he adds to the above definition of specific sufficiency
the property that the distribution of R(x) shall be independent of the nuisance
parameter. This is a rather restrictive property (X¯ in the example above is then
not specifically sufficient). On the other hand he is then able to establish links with
decision problems. He shows that by testings and point estimations concerning ρ,
the statistician may limit himself to procedures depending on R(x) without losing
power or efficiency. Below we shall expand upon some, but not all, of the ideas
which we have sketched above.
”Sverdrup (1966, p. 312)
The paper continues with important comments, including Section II.E (Tests with optimal
power, Justification of Conditioning)
B.4.19. Andersen 1967, On partial sufficiency and partial ancillarity
Andersen (1967) This paper gives the definition of partial sufficiencty and partial ancillarity.
In the abstract, it explains that the target is not to discuss the
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B.4.20. Durbin 1969. Inferential aspects of the randomness of sample size in survey
sampling
Durbin (1969) is cited by Dawid (1975).
B.4.21. Durbin(1970), On Birnbaum’s theorem on the relation between sufficiency,
conditionality and likelihood
Durbin (1970) This note contains comments about Birnbaun’s theorem (see notes on
Birnbaum (1962)
B.4.22. Sandved, A principle for conditioning on an ancillary statistic. 1967
.
Sandved (1966) gives a definition of ancillarity for a decision problem.
“A statistical decision problem can usually be formulated in the following way: Xis a stochastic variable with probability measure P . (In this paper the stochastic
variables and the parameters may be multidimensional.) A priori P ∈ P, where P
is a given class of prbability measures. Based upon an observation of X we shall
choose a subclass of P which we believe contains P , or we shall give an estimate
for P .
”Sandved (1966, p. 1)
“Let Θ be a set of indices and {Pθ, θ ∈ Θ} be a family of non-empty subclasses ofP such that if P ∈ P, then P belongs to one and only one Pθ. We want to make
inferences on θ on the basis of an observation of X .
For instance, if we want to test a hypothesis, we may let Θ consist of two elements,
θ0 and θ1, i.e. to accept or to reject the hypothesis.
Let a(X) be A -measurable. a(X) induces a sub-σ- algebra A a of A . Let P a be
the measure P restricted to A a, and let Paθ be the class of all P
a with P ∈ Pθ.
Let a(X) be a statistic such that
i) The classes Pa
θ
, θ ∈ Θ are identical.
ii) The class of conditional probability distributions of X , given a(X), θ and
P a, is independent of P a.
We then define a(X) to be an ancillary statistic for the decision problem, and we
propose the following principle: In the decision problem at hand start with the
conditional distribution of X given a(X).
”Sandved (1966, p. 6.)
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B.4.23. Barndorff-Nielsen (1973)
Barndorff-Nielsen (1973) definitions are discussed in two papers later Dawid (1975), and
Basu (1977). This is the citation from Dawid (1975, p. 249) (notations were changed to
match ours, and for Dawid (1975), one can consider that Ω = X and X = IdΩ): “The data
of a statistical experiment may be expressed as a random quantity [X ∶ (Ω,SΩ)→X ] taking
values in a space [X ] and with a [set of distributions {PX ∣ P ∈ P}] over [X ] [...]. Suppose
that [θ ∶ {PX ∣ P ∈ P} →] is a parameter-function. Let [U = u(X),V = v(X)] be statistics.
Then we can ask what useful meaning can be assigned to the statements:
1. U is sufficient for θ(PX);
2. V is ancillary for θ(PX).
We shall be primarily concerned with the following one of many attemps to give precise
meaining to these ideas. Barndorff-Nielsen (1973) has called a statistic U a cut with corre-
sponding parameters [θ, θ¯] if
θ(P ) and [θ¯(P )] vary independently as [P ] varies in P, and are together equivalent to{PX ∣ P ∈ P} [e.g. (θ, θ¯) Ü {PX ∣ P ∈ P},ed]
1. The distribution [PU ] depends on θ alone [e.g, ∃θ′ ∶ θ({PX ∣ P ∈ P}) → such that(P ↦ PU) = θ′ ○ θ,ed] and
2. The conditional distribution [PX ∣ U ] depends only on [θ¯(P )] [ed, e.g. ∃θ¯′ ∶ θ¯({PX ∣
P ∈ P})→ such that (PX ↦ (PX)u) = θ¯′ ○ θ¯]
B.4.24. Dawid, 1975
Dawid (1975) shows ”ambiguities [that] may arise from attempts to define and apply ana-
logues of sufficiency and ancillarity in the presence of nuisance parameters“. Dawid (1975)
refers to Barndorff-Nielsen (1973). The general definition of S sufficiency is recalled.
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“The data of statistical experiment may be expressed as a random quantity x taking
values in a space X , and with a distribution Pω ober X depending on a parameter
ω taking values in Ω. Suppose that θ = θ(ω) is a parameter-function (henceforth
called simply ”parameter“). Let u, v be statistics. Then we can ask what useful
meaning can be assigned to the statements:
i) u is sufficient for θ;
ii) u is ancillary for θ.
We shall be primarily concerned with the following one of many attemps to give
precise meaining to these ideas. Barndorff-Nielsen (1973) has called a statistic u a
cut with corresponding parameters (θ,Φ) if (i) θ and Φ vary independently as ω
varies in Ω, and are together equivalent to ω (ii) The distribution Pu,ω of u depends
on θ alone and (iii) the conditional distribution P uω of x given u involves only Φ.
In the dominated case, (ii) and (iii) above are equivalent to
f(x ∣ ω) = f(u ∣ θ)f(x ∣ u,Φ), ((1.1))
where f represents a density with respect to an appropriate underlying measure.
(If Q is a probability distribution which dominates {Pω ∣ ω ∈ Ω}, the respective
measures in (1.1.) may be taken as Q, Qu and Qu.)
If (1.1) holds, there seems to be an intuitively appealing case for supposing that
all relevant information about θ may be extracted by referring u to its marginal
distribution; while for inference about Φ, we can refer x to its distribution condi-
tioned on u. This prompts the following definitions (Barndorff-Nielsen, 1973-after
Fraser, 1956; Sverdrup, 1966; Sandved, 1967).
If t is a statistic and λ = λ(u) a parameter, we call t S-sufficient for λ if there exists
some parametrization ω = (θ,Φ) as above, and a corresponding cut u, such that u
is a function of t and λ is a function of θ. Similarly, t is S-ancillary for µ if t is a
function of u and µ is a function of Φ.
”Dawid (1975, p. 248)
Dawid (1975)[Sec. 2-3] gives a historical overview of the issue: How to define specific suffi-
ciency, and where the debate comes from. Basu cite Barnard (1963),Andersen (1967),Durbin
(1969), Durbin (1970),Birnbaum (1962),Barndorff-Nielsen (1973).
Dawid (1975)[Sec. 3] mentions boundedly completeness for θ in presence of a nuisance
parameter without defining it. It is implicit that boundedly complete for θ means boundedly
complete when the complement φ of θ is fixed.
B.4.25. Basu (1975), Statistical Information and Likelihood
B.4.26. Basu, 1977 - On the Elimination of Nuisance Parameters
Basu (1977) summarizes and critics all that precedes and that is related to definition of
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partial and specific sufficiency, although the definitions are given in a dominated context. If
one paper has to be given as a reference, it should be this one.
Basu (1977, Sec.2, Marginalization and Conditioning) explains in what consists the
marginalization procedure (when a sufficient statistic is identified) and the conditioning
procedure (when an ancillary statistic is identified). Basu (1977, Sec.3, Partial sufficiency
and partial ancillarity) contains the definitions of
1. an ancillary statistic V : (P ↦ P V ) ≺ 1,
2. a θ-oriented statistic V : (P ↦ P V ) ≺ θ,
3. variation independence,
4. a (θ, θ¯)-specific sufficient statistic V : [(θ, θ¯) Ü P and (P ↦ P IdΩ∣V ) ≺ θ¯],
5. a (θ, θ¯)-specific ancillary statistic V : [(θ, θ¯) Ü P and (P ↦ P V ) ≺ θ¯],
6. a (θ, θ¯)-partially sufficient (or (θ, θ¯)-Sandved-sufficient or (θ, θ¯)-S-sufficient) statistic
is a (θ, θ¯)-specific sufficient and θ-orientated statistic : [(θ, θ¯) Ü P and (P ↦ P IdΩ∣V ) ≺
θ¯ and (P ↦ P V ) ≺ θ]
7. a (θ, θ¯)-partially ancillary (or (θ, θ¯)-Sandved-ancillary or (θ, θ¯)-S-ancillary) statistic
is a (θ, θ¯)-specific ancillary and (θ¯,θ)-specific sufficient statistic : [(θ, θ¯) Ü P and(P ↦ P IdΩ∣V ) ≺ θ and (P ↦ P V ) ≺ θ¯].
8. a Barndorff cut is a statistic V such that (P ↦ P V , P ↦ P IdΩ∣V ) Ü P.
Basu then explains that given θ, there does not necessarily exist a Barndorff cut V such
that θ ∶ P ↦ P V , and gives examples.
Then Basu gives equivalent definitions in the case of a dominated model.
“Definition 3 (θ- Oriented Statistic): The statistic T is θ oriented if the marginaldistribution of T depnds on ω only through θ = θ(ω). That is θ(ω1) = θ(ω2) implies
Pω1(T −1B) = Pω2(T −1B) for all B ∈ B.
Observe that every ancillary statistic is θ-oriented irrespectrive of what θ is.
”Basu (1977, p. 356 )
“Definition 4 (Variation Independence): The two functions ω → a(ω) and ω → b(ω)on the space Ω with respective ranges A and B are said to be variation independent
if the range of the function ω → (a(ω), b(ω)) is the Cartesian product A ×B.
”Basu (1977, p. 356 )
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“If the universal parameter ω can be represented as ω = (θ,φ), where θ and Φ arevariation independent in the preceding sense - that is Ω = Θ × Φ where Θ and
Φ are the respective ranges of θ and φ - then we cal φ a variation independent
complement of θ. With θ as the paremter of interest, we may then call φ the
nuisance parameter. We have not come across a satisfactory definition of the notion
of a nuisance parameter. It is only hoped that the above working definition will
meet with little resistance. (See Barndorff-Nielsen (1973) for durther details on the
notion of variation independence.
”Basu (1977, p. 357 )
B.4.27. Dawid (1979) - Conditional Independence in Statistical Theory
B.4.28. Basu, Pereira (1983) Conditional Independence in Statistics
B.4.29. Godambe, 1984, On Ancillarity and Fisher Information in the Presence of a
Nuisance Parameter
B.4.30. Yamada Morimoto - 1992 - Sufficiency
B.4.31. Severini, 1993, Local Ancillarity in the Presence of a Nuisance Parameter
B.4.32. Zhu, Reid, 1994 - Information, Ancillarity, and Sufficiency in the Presence of
Nuisance Parameters
B.4.33. Fraser (2004) Ancillaries and Conditional Inference
?
B.4.34. Ghosh Reid and Fraser, 2010, Ancillary Statistics: a review
Ghosh et al. (2010) This paper cites Basu1964, and a lot of others. It deals with nuisance
parameters. It refers to Bayesian ancillarity by Severini.
Appendix C: Notes on selected works related to the
definition of ignorable design of missing
data mechanism, and informative
selection
In this section, we tracked the appearance of the term informative and ignorable in the litter-
ature. We provide some notes on a selection of articles, and present them in an alphabetical
order. We also provide notes on some fundamental articles that precede the appearance of
those terms, as the need to take into account the selection process was identified before some
names were put on situations where it had or had not to.
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C.1. Early papers by Godambe and Ericson
Godambe (1966) explains why the likelihood function is “uninformative” in design based
inference, without giving a definition of the term. In this paper, a particular definition of
indepent linear estimators, linear sufficiency for linear combinaisons of observations, are
given. Those concepts did not prove popular afterwards and there is not much in this paper
to help us define properly what is informative selection.
C.1.1. Godambe 1969, “A fiducial argument with application to survey sampling”
Ericson (1969) A Bayesian framework, (the first for Bayesian ?). No mention of informative
selection. “No new principles of inference are necessary”. Develops results on the posterior
mean in special cases (special prior, special scheme).
C.2. Two papers by Scott, 1975, 1977
The paper by Scott (1977) that follows Scott (1975) is particularly important for two reasons:
1. it is likely the first one that actually provides a definition for a non-informative design.
2. it undelines the importance of taking into acccount what is observed in the definition
of an informative design.
The paper also states results such as “simple random sampling” is the only non informative
design, and underlines the importance of the design variables and the importance of their
use if they are available to the analyst during the analysis phase.
Nevertheless, two main problems remain: First, the authors did not consider sampling
with replacement, or taking into account the order in which units were selected, or other
possible observed or latent information related to the selected sample and the design, second
they did not tackle the issue of inference on a function of the parameter or prediction of a
particular function of the study variable. Although it acknowledge the fact that sometimes
units of the sample can be non identified and refers to Scott & Smith (1973)
The paper is done in a Bayesian framework.
In the introduction, Scott gives a definition of non-informative design:
“It is well known (see Godambe (1966) or Ericson ? that this posterior distributiondepends only on the sample actually drawn and not on the sampling desing used
to draw it, provided that [the sample of the population elements] and [the study
variable on the population] are independent random variables. (If this condition of
independence is satisfied the design is said to be non-informative.) ? has called this
conflict about the way inferences should depend on underlying design the problem
of randomization and most of the comments in the paper are concerned with this
small facet of the general problem of randomization in surveys.
”Scott (1977, Sec. 1 Introduction, p. 1.)
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Scott gives a result that is announced in the introduction:
“In the next section we show that simple random sampling is the only design that isalways non-informative. Other desingns are non-informative only if the information
used at the design stage is also available for the analysis. This may not be the case
in a secondary analysis carried out well after the collection of the original data, for
example. If supplementary information used in the design is not available for the
analysis, the posterior distribution depends on the design.
”Scott (1977, Sec. 1 Introduction, p. 1-2.)
??, Scott considers the case where the design variables on the population are known and
the sample and the study variables are independent conditionnally on the design variables,
and argues that the distribution of the study variable on the population conditional to
the design variable and all the information provided by the survey is proportional to the
distribution of the study variable on the population conditional to the design variable and
only the values of the study variable on the sample, and concludes that the design is then
non-informative.
“Consider a situation in which information is available on some related characteris-tic, say x = (x1, . . . , xN), which can be used in the design. We write p(s ∣ x for the
probability of drawing sample s and ξ(Y ∣ x) for the conditional prior density of
y given x. If s and y are conditionally independent for the given value x, then the
posterior distribution of y is
p(y ∣ (i, yi; i ∈ s),x) = p(s∣xξ(y∣x)∫Ys p(s∣x)ξ(y∣xdy for y ∈ Ys= 0 otherwise,
where Ys = {y∗ ∈ Y ∶ y∗i = yi for i ∈ s}. This reduces to
p(y ∣ (i, yi; i ∈ s),x) ∝ ξ(y ∣ x) for y ∈ Ys= 0 otherwise,
so that the design is non-informative to anyone who knows x and plays no part in
the analysis.
”Scott (1977, Sec.2, p. 2)
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“Even if all supplematary information is available the design may still be informativeif the sampled elements cannot be identified. The situation was discussed in detail
in Scott & Smith (1973)
”Scott (1977, p. 3)
The remaining does not contain more that could be helpful for the definition of informa-
tiveness of the paper contains a discussion about “robust sampling strategies”, that take into
account both the design and the estimation. The paper discusses robustness follwing Black-
well and Girshick, and participates in the debate about using unequal probability sampling
and refers to Basu, Royall and Ericson again.
C.3. Rubin 1976
Rubin (1976)
1. defines what it means to ignore the missing data mechanism
2. define three conditions on the density of the distribution of the missing data mechanism
conditional
3. For different type of inference (a,. sampling distribution inference about θ, b. direct
likelihood inference, c. Bayesian inference), Rubin (1976):
(a) defines what it means to say that it is appropriate to ignore the missing data
mechanism, e.g the definition of what is an ignarable missing data mechanism.
(b) Give conditions for ignoring appropriately the missing data mechanism
Note that in this paper, the term ignorable is not used. It has been introcuced later and
it is now popular in the expressions ignorable or non ignorable missing data mechanism.
In this section, we give the definitions and theorems of Rubin (1976).
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“ 3. Notation for the random variables
Let U = (U1, . . . Un) be a vector random variable with probability density function
fθ. The objective is to make inferences about θ, the vector parameter of this den-
sity.[...] Let M = (M1, . . .MN) be the associated “missing data indicator” vector
random variable [...]. The probability tat M takes the value m = (m1, . . . ,mn)
given that U takes the value u = (u1, . . . , un) is gφ(m ∣ u), where φ is the nuisance
vector parameter of the distribution. The conditional distribution gφ corresponds
to “the process that causes missing data”[...].More precisely, define the extended
vector random variable V = (V1, . . . , Vn) with range extended to include the special
value ∗ for missing data.“
”Rubin (1976, p. 584)
The transition from Rubin (1976) notations to ours is the following: (U ↪ Y ), (n ↪ N),(fθ ↪ fY ), (θ ↪ θ), (M ↪ I), (φ ↪ θ¯), (m ↪ i), (gφ(m ∣ u)↪ fI ∣Y =y(i). In our notations, the
framework chosen by Rubin (1976) is the following: IdΩ = (T,Y ), Y follows an i.i.d population
model and T is a without replacement selection. The conditioning variable z is not needed
here. We have naturally (θ ∶ P ↦ P Y , θ¯ ∶ P ↦ P I ∣Y . The observation is X = (T [Y ], I), which
is equivalent to X = (T [Y ], T ) in this setup.
Implicitely, Rubin (1976) assumes a parametric dominated model both for P ↦ P Y and
P ↦ P I ∣Y . Note that what rubins calls a ”missing data indicator“ is indeed a ”non-missing
data indicator“ as mi = 1⇔ Yi is observed.
“Hence the observed value ofM , namely m˜, effects a partition of each of the vectorsof random variables and the vectors of observed values into two vectors correspond-
ing to m˜i = 0 for missing data and m˜i = 1 for observed data.
”Rubin (1976, p. 584)
Rubin defines new variables, the link from Rubin to our notation is as follows:(U(0) ↪ (Yk)k∈{1,...,N ∣Ik=0}), (U(1) ↪ (Yk)k∈{1,...,N ∣Ik=1}).
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“ 5. Ignoring the process that causes missing data.
[...]
Definition 1. The missing data are missing at random if for each value of φ, gφ(m˜ ∣
u˜) takes the same value for all u(0),
”Rubin (1976, p. 584)
In Rubin notation, u˜ is the concatenation of the unobserved u(0) and the observed
u(1).Rubin (1976, Definition 1) is ambiguous for the following reasons:
1. The notation gφ(m˜ ∣ (u(0), u˜(1)) can denote the value taken by gφ for specific m˜, u(0) and
u(1), but it sometimes denotes the function gφ(. ∣ (., u˜(1)) ∶ (m˜, u(0))↦ gφ(m˜ ∣ (u(0), u˜(1))
for a specific (m˜, u˜(1)) and it could as well denote gφ(. ∣ (u(0), u˜(1)) ∶ (m˜) ↦ gφ(m˜ ∣(u(0), u˜(1)) for a specific u˜(1). Which leads to 3 possibilities.
2. In which order should we read ”for each value of φ“, ”takes the same value“ and ”for
all u(0)“? 2 consecutive forall are interchangeable, and ”for each value of φ“ was stated
before ”for all u(0)“ so out of the 6 permutations, there are 4 possible interpretations.
Combining these ambiguities lead to 12 possible interpretations. Nevertheless, when Rubin
considers whether data is missing at random for each of his examples, he clearly distinguishes
cases for different values of m˜ (More precisely, for example 2, Table 1 reads: MAR only if
all m˜i = 1, which means that depending on the observed value for m˜, one same missing data
mechanism may be considered at random or not). Rubin uses the notation ”˜ “ to notice fixed
specific values of the different parameters. The use of m˜, u˜ and v˜ shows the definition apply
for a specific value of m˜ and u˜(1). Confronting the different possible interpretations of the
definition with Rubin (1976, Table 1), one can conclude that the only right interpretation is:
[For the specific observed (m˜, u˜(1)), ∀φ, ∃C such that ∀u(0), gφ(m˜ ∣ (u(0), u˜(1)) = C], and one
can discard the other interpretations as for example: [For the specific observed (m˜, u˜(1)), ∃C
such that ∀φ,∀u(0), ∀m˜, gφ(m˜ ∣ (u(0), u˜(1)) = C], or [∀m˜, ∃C such that ∀u(0), gφ(m˜ ∣(u(0), u˜(1)) = C].
This definition by Rubin has also the following drawabacks: 1. when the conditional dis-
tribution of P T ∣Y =y is uniquely defined, the conditional density of T ∣ Y = y, when it is
defined, is a class of density distribution that are equal P T ∣Y =y-almost surely(t), so this
definition depends on a choice of representants of the density that must be made prior
to its application. 2. the domain of variation of {u(0) is not specified. It is implicitely
U(0)((M,U(1))−1({(m˜, u˜(1))}).
So the rigth interpretation of Rubin (1976, Definition 1) is the folling:
Definition 16 (Missing at random, Rubin’s definition, Rubin’s notations, detailed). The
missing data are missing at random contitionnally to M = m˜ and U(1) = u˜(1) if
∀φ, ∃C such that ∀u(0) ∈ U(0)((M,U(1))−1({(m˜, u˜(1))}), gφ(m˜ ∣ (u(0), u˜(1))) = C, (7)
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Below is the translation of Rubin (1976, Definitions 1) in our notations. It is valid in the
following framework: Assume that Y follows a population model of known size N , that T is a
selection, that X = (T [Y ] = (Yk)k∈{1,...,N ∣Ik=1} , I), and that IdΩ = (T,Y ). Consider θ ∶ P → P Y
and θ¯ ∶ P ↦ P I ∣Y .
Definition 17 (Missing at Random, Rubin’s definition, our notations). Let {fT ∣Y ;P (.) ∣
P ∈ P} be a set of unique representants for each P ∈ P of the classes of the condi-
tional distribution densities of T ∣ Y . The missing data is missing at random with respect to{fT ∣Y ;P (.) ∣ P ∈ P} and the (not necessarily distinct) separation (θ ∶ P ↦ P Y , θ¯ ∶ P ↦ P T ∣Y )
conditional to X = x, with X = (T [Y ], T ) = (, y⋆, t), if and only if any of the following
equivalent conditions apply:
∀θ¯ ∈ θ¯(P), ∃C ∈ R such that ∀y ∈ Y ((T [Y ], T )−1 ((y⋆, t))) ,∀P ∈ θ¯−1(θ¯), fT ∣Y =y;P (t) = C.
(8)
( ∶ P × ((Y,T ) (X−1({x}))) → ,(P, (y, t)) ↦ fT ∣Y =y;P (t) ) ≺ (
∶ P × ((Y,T ) (X−1({x}))) → ,(P, (y, t)) ↦ (θ¯(P ), t(y)) )
(9)
There are many choices of generalisation that would match Rubin’s definition, because Ru-
bin is observing T = t and T [Y ] = t(y). In another setup, where only T is observerd, we could
replace (θ¯(P ), t(y) in the second part of Equation (15) by (θ¯(P ), t), or by (θ¯(P ), t, t(y)).
We choose the weakest condition that allows to get the equivalent of Rubin theorem and it
that still generalize Rubin’s definition.
Which leads to the following general definition
Definition 18 (At Random, 1st generalisation). Let V , W be two random variables. Let
θ, θ¯ a (non necessarily distinct) separation of P and let {fW ∣V ;P (.) ∣ P ∈ P} be a set of
unique representants for each P ∈ P of the classes of the conditional distribution densities
of W ∣ V . Let (θ, θ¯) be a (non necessarily distinct) separation of P. Then W is at random
with respect to the separation (θ, θ¯) conditional to the observation is X = x, if and only if:(P ↦ P V ) ≺ θ, (P ↦ PW ∣V ) ≺ θ¯, and
( ∶ P × ((V,W ) (X−1({x}))) → ,(P, (v,w)) ↦ fW ∣V =v;P (w) ) ≺ (∶ (P, (v,w)) ↦ (θ¯(P ),w) ) (10)
A sufficient condition for the condition (16) to hold is:
( ∶ P × ((V,W ) (Ω))) → ,(P, v,w) ↦ fW ∣V =v;P (w) ) ≺ (∶ (P, v,w) ↦ (θ¯(P ),w) ) (11)
,
A sufficient condition for the condition (16) to hold is:
(∶ (P × V )→, (P, v)↦ PW ∣V =v) ≺ (∶ (P × V )→, (P, v)↦ θ¯(P )) (12)
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, which itself implies that
∀P,V ⊥ P W (13)
,
Rubin follows with the definition of observed at random:
“Definition 2. The observed data are observed at random if for each value of φ andu(0), gφ(m˜ ∣ u˜) takes the same value for all u(1).
”Rubin (1976, p. 584)
The right interpretation is the following, in Rubin’s notations:
∀φ ∈ Ωφ,∀u(0) ∈ U(0)(M−1({m˜})), ∃C ∈ R such that ∀u(1) ∈ U(1)((M,U(0))−1({(m˜, u˜(0))})), gφ(m˜ ∣ (u(0), u(1))) = C,
(14)
Rubin definition of ”observed at random“ is less local than its definition of missing at
random as it implies the variation of both u(0) and u(1).
Rubin definition of missing at random is the definition of a local property for a specific
u(1) and m˜. From there two versions of the definition can be proposed: a local version, for a
specific value of u(1) and m˜, and a uniform version, where the local condition must hold for
all possible u(1) and m˜.
The definition of observed as random is more difficult to translate in a general framework as
it requires to define what we do not observe about Y , wich was not the case for the definition
of observed at random. Define T¯ as the transformation such that for all ω, T¯ [Y ](ω) is the
function U(ω) ∖L(ω)→, k ↦ Y [k](ω).
Definition 19 (Observed at Random, Rubin’s definition, our notations). The observed
data are observed at random if ∀θ¯ ∈ θ¯(P), ∀y¯ ∈ T¯ [Y ](T −1({t}), ∃C ∈ R such that ∀y ∈
T [Y ] ((T, T¯ [Y ])−1({(t, y¯)})), ∀P ∈ θ¯−1(θ¯), fT ∣Y =y(t) = C.
This definition requires to define T¯ . We opt for defining the complementation on (T ).
Definition 20 (Observed at Random, Rubin’s definition, our notations, 2d version). Let{fT ∣Y ;P (.) ∣ P ∈ P} be a set of unique representants for each P ∈ P of the classes of
the conditional distribution densities of T ∣ Y . Let t¯: ((T ) →, such that ∀t, t¯ is a (non
necessarily distinct) complement of t. The transformed data is observed at random with
respect to {fT ∣Y ;P (.) ∣ P ∈ P} and the the (not necessarily distinct) separation (θ ∶ P ↦
P Y , θ¯ ∶ P ↦ P T ∣Y ) conditional to X = x, with X = (T [Y ], T ), if and only if:
( ∶ P × ((Y,T ) (T −1 (T (X−1({x}))))) →(P, (y, t)) ↦ fT ∣Y =y;P (t) ) ≺ (∶ (P, (y, t)) ↦ (θ¯(P ), t¯(y)))
(15)
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Definition 21 (Observed at Random, our notations, General). Let V , W be two random
variables. Let θ, θ¯ a (non necessarily distinct) separation of P and let {fW ∣V ;P (.) ∣ P ∈ P}
be a set of unique representants for each P ∈ P of the classes of the conditional distribution
densities ofW ∣ V . Let (θ, θ¯) be a (non necessarily distinct) separation of P. And for w ∈ W ,
let w¯ denote a (non necessarily distinct) complement of w. Then W is observed at random
with respect to the separation (θ, θ¯) and to the complementation on W conditionally on the
observation is X = x, if and only if: (P ↦ P V ) ≺ θ, (P ↦ PW ∣V ) ≺ θ¯, and
( ∶ P × ((V,W ) (W −1(W (X−1({x}))))) → ,(P, (v,w)) ↦ fW ∣V =v;P (w) ) ≺ (∶ (P, (v,w)) ↦ (θ¯(P ), w¯(v)) )
(16)
“Definition 3. The parameter φ is distinct from θ if their joint parmeter spacefactorises into a φ-space and a θ-space, and when prior distributions are specified
for θ and φ, if these are independent.
”Rubin (1976, p. 585)
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“ 6. Missing data and sampling distribution inference
A sampling distribution inference is an inference that results solely from comparing
the observed value of a statistic, e.g an estimator, test criterion or confidence
interval, with the sampling distribution of that statistic under various hypothesized
underlying distributions. Whithin the context of sampling distribution inference,
the parameters θ and φ have fixed hypothesized values. Ignoring the process that
causes missing data when making a sampling distribution inference about the true
value of θ means comparing the observed value of some vector statistic S(v˜),
equivalently S(m˜, u˜(1)), to the distribution of S(v) found from fθ. More precisely,
the sampling distribution of S(v˜) ignoring the process that causes missing data is
found by fixing M at the observed m˜ and assuming that the sampling distribution
of the observed data follows from density (5⋅1) which is the marginal density of
U(1) but from the conditional density of U(1) given that the random variable m˜:
∫ {fθ(u)gφ(m˜ ∣ u)/kθ,φ(m˜)}du(0), (6⋅1)
where kθ,φ(m˜) = ∫ fθ(u)gφ(m˜ ∣ u)du, which is the marginal probability that M
takes the value m˜. Hence the correct sampling distribution of S(v˜) depends in
general not only on the fixed hypothesized fθ but also on the fixed hypothesized
gφ.
”Rubin (1976, p. 585)
Ignoring a (non necessarily) observed latent random transformation T when making in-
ference on P Y consists in chosing a transformation t compatible with X = x and considering
that the distribution of Y given X = x is the distribution of Y given x(t(Y ), t) = x.
“Theorem 6⋅1. Suppose that (a) the missing data are missing at random and (b)
the observed data are observed at random. Then the sampling distribution of S(v˜)
under fθ ignoring the process that causes missing data, i.e. calculated from density(5 ⋅ 1), equals the correct conditional sampling distribution of S(v˜) given m˜ under
fθgφ, that is calculated from density (6 ⋅ 1) assuming kθ,φ(m˜) > 0.
”Rubin (1976, p. 585)
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“Theorem 6⋅2. The sampling distribution of S(v˜) under fθ calculated by ignoring
the process that causes missing data equals the correct condition sampling distribu-
tion of S(v˜) given m˜ under fθgφ for every S(v˜), if and only if
Eu(0) {gφ(m˜ ∣ u) ∣ m˜, u(1), θ, φ} = kθ,φ(m˜) > 0. (6⋅2)
. [...] The phrase ’ignoring the process that causes missing data when making
sampling distribution inferences’ may suggest not only calculating sampling distri-
butions with respect to denstity (6⋅1) but also interpretin g the resulting sampling
distribtions as unconditional rather than conditional on m˜.
Theorem 6⋅3. The sampling distribution of S(v˜) under fθ calculated ignoring the
process that causes missing data equals the correct unconditional sampling distri-
bution of S(v˜) under fθgφ for all S(v˜) if and only if gφ(m˜ ∣ u) = 1.
”Rubin (1976, p. 585)
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“ 7. Missing data and direct-likelihood inference
A direct-likelihood inference is an inference that results solely from ratios of the
likelihood function for various values of the parameter (Edwards, 1972). Within
the context of direct likelihood inference, θ and φ take values in a joint paramter
space Ωθ,φ. Ignoring the process that causes missind data when making a direct-
likelihood inference for θ means defining a parameter space for θ, Ωθ and taking
radios, for various θ ∈ Ωθ, of the marginial likelihood function based on density (5⋅
1):
L (θ ∣ v˜) = δ(θ,Ωθ)∫ fθ(u˜)du(0), (7⋅1)
sw21 where δ(a,Ω) is the indicator function of Ω. Likelihood (7⋅1) is regarded as
a function of θ given the observed m˜ and u˜(1).
The problem with this approach is tat M is a random variable whose value is also
observed, so that the actual likelihood is the joint likelihood of the observed data
u˜(1) and m˜:
L (θ,φ ∣ v˜) = δ{(θ,φ),Ωθ,Φ}∫ fθ(u˜)gΦ(m˜ ∣ u˜)du(0), (7⋅2)
regarded as a function of θ, φ given the observed u˜(1) and m˜.
Theorem 7⋅1. Suppose (a) that the missing data are missing at random and (b)
that φ is distinct from θ. Then the likelihodd ratio ignoring the process that causes
missing data, that is L (θ1 ∣ v˜)/L (θ2 ∣ v˜), equals the correct likelihood ration, that
is L (θ1, φ ∣ v˜)/L (θ2, φ ∣ v˜), for all φ ∈ Ωφ such that gφ(m˜ ∣ u˜) > 0. [...]
Theorem 7⋅2. Suppose L (θ ∣ v˜) > 0 for all θ ∈ Ωθ. All likelihood ratios for θ ∈ Ωθ
ignoring the causes missing data are correct for all φ ∈ Ωφ, if (a) Ωθ,φ = Ωθ ×
Omegaφ and (b) for each φ ∈ Ωφ, Eu(1){gφ(m˜ ∣ u˜(1), θ, φ} takes the same positive
value for all θ ∈ Ωθ.
”Rubin (1976, p. 586)
In the lineage of Rubin (1976), a series of paper targeted specific issues in survey
sampling that are missing data issues and proposed solutions to solve them. Those pa-
pers do not bring more concepts that are of interest for the current paper, although
they were fundamental for survey statistics in general: Rubin (1978) introduced multi-
ple imputation in sample surveys, and Little (1982) extends Rubin’s results to nonre-
sponse: Non response mechanism is seen as a missing data process, and contains more
details about ways to deal with ignorable or non ignorable response, as for example
the EM algorithm. It also stresses on the fact that there exist cases where the ob-
servation is not only the values of the study variables for all units in the sample.
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“Following Rubin (1976, 1978, 1980), we say that the sample design is ignorable ifinferences based on the distribution f(xs ∣ z; θ) are equivalent to inferences based
on the full distribution f(xs, δ ∣ z; θ,φ)
”Little (1982)
“We clarify the key concept of missingness at random in incomplete data analysis.We first distinguish between data being missing at random and the missingness
mechanism being a missing-at-random one, which we call missing always at ran-
dom and which is more restrictive. We further discuss how, in general, neither
ofthese conditions is a statement about conditional independence.We then con-
sider the implication ofthe more restrictive missing-always-at-random assumption
when coupled with full unit-exchangeability for the matrix ofthe variables ofinter-
est and the missingness indicators: the conditional distribution of the missingness
indicators for any variable that can have a missing value can depend only on vari-
ables that are always fully observed. We discuss implications of this for modelling
missingness mechanisms.
”Mealli & Rubin (2015, Abstract)
C.4. The ambiguous definition of Cassel, Sarndal and Wretman,
1977, for design-based inference under the fixed population
model
Cassel et al. (1977) propose a definition of informative selection in a framework that proves
to be of little interest, because they define it in a fixed population framework and refer to
the dependency between two variables that are not stochastic in their framework (the design
variable and the study variable), thus necessarily independent. According to this definition,
in their framework, all design is non informative. The term ”depend“ is ambiguous as it may
refer to stochastic or deterministic dependence, but in none of the case it is precised in the
book.
This is the comment made in Bonne´ry (2011):
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“Definition 1.6. of non-informative selection applied to the fixed population modelis not consistent with the definition proposed in Cassel et al. (1977, p. 12), which
reads, after replacing their p by q for consistency with our notation: “A sampling
design [...] q(.) is called a non-informative design if and only if q(.) is a function
that does not depend on the y-values associated with the labels in [the sample]
s[...].” This definition is ambiguous. The ambiguity comes from the fact that in
Cassel et al. (1977), the model for inference is not complete because the set of
parameters is not given, and what is really meant by “does not depend on” is not
explained.
In Cassel et al. (1977), the design measure p is fixed, but may depend (non
stochastically) on a function of the parameter y. So we consider that in
Cassel et al. (1977), the statistical model which is implicitly referred to is
parametrized by the couple (p, y) that belongs to some subset Θ′ of S × Y (Ω)N .
The statement that p does not depend on (yk)k∈U,Ik≥1 is not ambiguous in some
particular cases:
• In the case where Θ′ = {p0} ×B where p0 ∈ S , B ⊆ Y (Ω)N , then i ↦ p({i})
is a constant function of (yk)k∈U,ik=1.
• In the case where Θ′ = {(Poissony, y)∣ y ∈ Y (Ω)N}, Y (Ω) = [0,1] then the
definition indicates that the sample is informative, as the probability to draw
a sample depends in part on the values of y on the sample.
But the definition can be ambiguous in cases where the dependence on
y is not direct, but is indirectly imposed by some non trivial corre-
spondence between p and y. For example, in the case where Θ′ ={(Poissonz, y)∣ y ∈ [0,1]N , z ∈ [0,1]N , ∥y − z∥2 ≤ 12}, it is very difficult to apply the
Cassel et al. (1977) definition to determine whether the sample design is informa-
tive or not.
Nevertheless, according to a certain interpretation of “does not depend on”, the
Cassel et al. (1977) definition can be understood as:
The selection is non-informative if ∃A ⊆ S , B ⊆ Y (Ω)N , such that Θ′ = A ×B.
”Bonne´ry (2011)
C.5. Sugden Smith 1984
Sugden & Smith (1984), establish “Conditions under which partially known designs can be
ignored”. This paper is in the lineage of Scott (1977) and Rubin (1976). The paper is par-
ticularly important for the current paper for the following reason: following Scott (1977), it
considers different cases based on what is observed: the values on the sample only, or with the
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design variables values on the sample, or with the design variable values on the population.
This stresses the importance of having a definition that depends on what is observed, and
that should not be restricted to the particular case of observing the study variables on the
design only as in Rubin (1976). The paper does not contain a definition on informative or
uninformative, but it refers to Scott (1977).
The introduction is of particular interest as it gives a short but detailed review of the litter-
ature.
“In a model-based approach to survey sampling inference the role played by the sur-vey design is not completely clear. Sone ahtors such as Godambe (1966), ?, Ericson
(1969), ?, ? and ? recognize that random sampling schems may have desirable ro-
bustness properties in a model-based approach but that other designs, such as bal-
anced samples may be vetter for some purposes. Scott (1977) and Scott & Smith
(1973) examine the conditions under which any survey design can be ignored for
Bayesian inference. If these conditions are not satisfied the averages over subsets
of the randomization distribution may be necessary for valid Bayesian inference.
Rubin (1976) is a fubndamental paper on missing values, interprets sampling as a
special case of missing values and establishes conditions under which the selection
method can be ignored for model-based inferences from the Bayesian, likelihood or
sampling theory viewpoints. Little (1982) extends Rubnin’s results to nonresponse
and ? to non random designs such as quota sampling which depend on response
variables. The key to understanding the role of survey design is to follow Scott
(1977) and introduce the idea of design variables, known to the sampler before the
sample is drawn, in addition to the response variables measured in the survey.
”Sugden & Smith (1984, Introduction, p. 495)
In section 4, Sugden and Smith give examples of informative and non informative designs.
The term informative and noninformative appear in the paper three times together, once in
the title, and in the two quotes below:
“ [Simple random sampling] is independent of any variable, design or response, socertainly satisfies .[?, Condition 1] regards this as the only uniformly noninforma-
tive design.
”Sugden & Smith (1984, Sec. 4. Ingorable Designs, p. 501)
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“Before embarking on an analysis of survey data collected by others an analyst mustexamine his data set and his knowledge of the selection mechanism carefully to see
if Condition 1 is satisfied or not. If not, then the design forms an explicit part of
the model- based inference, and is ’informative’ Scott (1977)
Also it is important to notice that Sugden & Smith (1984) do not differentiate
non-informative design and ignorable design.
”Sugden & Smith (1984, Sec. 4. Ingorable Designs, p. 504)
C.6. Baird 1983
? Fisher Pearson controversy. This is a controversy about using degrees of freedom, and
informativeness of the hypothesis. MB: uses the word informative hypothesis. This paper is
of little interest for us.
C.7. Pfeffermann et al., 1998, ”Parametric distributions of
Complex Survey Data Under Informative Probability
Sampling“ and subsequent in line work.
Pfeffermann et al. (1998) as well as other papers on the same topic by Pfeffermann give
a heuristic definition of informative selection: Selection is informative when it has to be
taken into account. Which has the merit to be the most consensual and general definition
of informative selection given. They emphasize a consequence of informative selection: the
sample and population distributions are different. They also develop tools for the analyst
to make inference in presence of informative selection. The tool propose is derived from
the approximation of the sample probability density function by a weighted version of the
population probability distribution. The inference proposed is made in two stages: 1. the
modeling of the design variable conditional to the study variable, from which can be derived
an expression of the weighted distribution that will depend on this nodel parameters. 2. the
estimation of both the nuisance and interest parameters.
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“The sample distribution is defined as the distribution of the sample mea- surementsgiven the selected sample. Under informative sampling, this distribution is different
from the corresponding population distribution, although for several examples the
two distributions are shown to be in the same family and only differ in some
or all the parameters. A general approach of approximating the marginal sample
distribution for a given population distribution and first order sample se- lection
probabilities is discussed and illustrated.
”Pfeffermann et al. (1998, Abstract)
“Survey data may be viewed as the outcome of two random processes: The processgenerating the values in the finite population, often referred to as the ‘superpopu-
lation model’, and the process selecting the sample data from the finite population
values, known as the ‘sample selection mechanism’. Analytic inference from survey
data relates to the superpopulation model, but when the sample selection proba-
bilities are correlated with the values of the model response variables even after
conditioning on auxiliary variables, the sampling mechanism becomes informative
and the selection effects need to be accounted for in the inference process. In this
article, we propose a general method of inference on the population distribution
(model) under informative sampling that consists of approximating the parametric
distribution of the sample measurements. The sample distribu- tion is defined as
the distribution of measurements corresponding to the units in the sample.“
”Pfeffermann et al. (1998, Sec. 1, Introduction)
Still, a general mathematical definition of informative selection is needed. And with respect
to the new concepts of sample and population pdfs, as well as limit sample pdfs, more general
definitions were also needed.
Following Pfeffermann et al. (1998), a series of paper focus on the consequence of infor-
mative selection of inducing a difference between the sample and population distribution.
Below are some quotes from a selection of these papers related to the definition of informative
selection.
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“Pfeffermann, Krieger, and Rinott (1998) pointed out that survey data can oftenbe viewed as outcomes of two random processes. In the first process, data are gen-
erated from a (finite or infinite) population. However, we do not fully observe the
data in the first process. Given the data from the first process, the second process
generates a subset of data that are fully model on the distribution of the data and
the covariates. Often in a study, apart from the variable of interest, auxiliary in-
formation is available that can be used to increase the precision of estimators. For
example, in many surveys, the population means (or totals) of several covariates are
known, which leads to the well-known ratio estimators and regression estimators
(Cochran 1977; Rao, Kovar, and Mantel 1990; Sarndal, Swensson, and Wretman
1992). Various other methin two-phase sampling. Otherwise, the nonresponse is
nonignorable and the second-phase sampling is informative
”Qin et al. (2002)
““If, however, the selection probabilities are related to the response variable valueseven after conditioning on the values of the explanatory variables included in the
model, the sampling design becomes informative and the model holding for the
sample data differs from the model holding in the population. Ignoring the sampling
process in such cases may yield biased predictors for the target characteristics of
interest. ” and mathematic: “Equation (2) defines the relationship between the
population and sample distributions, so that if πi depends on yi, then E(πi∣yi) =
E(πi)andfp(yi) = fs(yi). In this case the population distribution differs from the
sample distribution and the sample design is informative.
”Pfeffermann (2002)
“ [...] that the selection probabilities are correlated with the variables of interest,even when conditioned on explanatory variables.
”Eideh & Nathan (2006a)
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“When the sample selection probabilities depend on the values of the model responsevariable, even after conditioning on auxiliary variables, the sampling mechanism
becomes informative and the selection effects need to be accounted for in the
inference process.
”Eideh & Nathan (2006b)
“When the sampling probabilities are related to the values of the outcome vari-able after conditioning on the model covariates, the sampling process becomes
informative and the model holding for the sample data is then different from the
corresponding population model before sampling
”Pfeffermann et al. (2006)
“When the selection probabilities are related to the values of the response variable,even after conditioning on concomitant variables included in the population model,
the sample design is defined as informative.
”Eideh & Nathan (2009)
“The sample selection probabilities in at least some stages of the sample selection areoften unequal; when these probabilities are related to the model outcome variable,
the sampling process becomes informative and the model holding for the sample
is then different from the target population model.
”Pfeffermann (2011)
C.8. In the lineage of Fuller, 2011, Sampling Statistics
In the book by Fuller, the definition of informative design is given like follows:
“If E[xiπiei] ≠ 0, it is sometimes said that the design is “informative” for the model.“”Fuller (2011, p. 355 sec. 6.3.2)
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The quantities xi, πi and ei are the values of the study variable, the inclusion probability
and an error term of a linear model between xi and the design variable for the individual i
of the sample. This definition only gives a vague idea in a very restricted context of what
informative selection refers to. Still, some authors refer to Fuller (2011), as for example ?
to define informtive selection.
A series of article are in line with Fuller (2011), and define informative selection in the
same very restrictive model. Quotes from a selection of such papers are provided below:
“However, in many practical situations the inclusion probabilities πj,i may be relatedto associated yi,j even when conditioning on the model covariates, xij . In such cases,
we have “informative sampling” and the model (1), holding for the population, no
longer holds for the sample. As a result, the estimators obtained by assuming that
the model (1) holds for the sample may be heavily biased and their mean squared
errors (MSE) significantly increased. It is therefore necessary to use methods that
can account for informative sampling.
”Verret et al. (2010)
Kim & Skinner (2013)are in line with Fuller (2011) when defining informative selection.
Below are two quotes from this paper:
“Sampling related to the outcome variable of a regression analysis conditional oncovariates is called informative sampling.
”Kim & Skinner (2013, Abstract p. 386)
Kim & Skinner (2013) refer to Fuller (2011), although, how we have seen, this definition
is very restrictive.
“Surveyweights are often used in regression analysis of survey data to ensure con-sistent estimation of parameters when sampling may be informative, that is when
sample inclusion may be related to the outcome variable conditional on covariates
(Fuller, 2009, §6.3)
”Kim & Skinner (2013, Abstract p. 386)
The authors also give the following mathematical definition of informative sampling:
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“We assume a probability sampling design, where inclusion in the sample is repre-sented by the indicator variables Ii(i = 1, . . . ,N), where Ii = 1 if unit i is included
in the sample and Ii = 0 otherwise and πi = pr(Ii = 1 ∣ i) is the first-order inclusion
probability. THen the ordinary least squares estimator of β0 solves
N∑
i=1
Ii(yi − x′iβ)xi = 0 ((2))
for β, and this estimator will generally be biased unless sampling is noninformative,
that is Ii and yi are pairwise independent conditional on xi,
pr(Ii = 1∣yi, xi) = pr(Ii = 1∣xi). ((3))
”Kim & Skinner (2013, Sec. 2. Basic Setup)
This definition ignores the potential issue with informative sampling which is that it may
induce dependence among sample units, as for example in cluster sampling: All inclusion
probabilities may be constant, conditioning on x or x and y will not change the probability
to be selected, and still, the design is clearly informative.
C.9. Bonne´ry, Breidt and Coquet
In a series of three papers, Bonne´ry, Breidt and Coquet explored the properties of the approx-
imated sample distribution as described by Pfeffermann. They proposed a general definition
of the sample distribution that can be applied to both with and with replacement selection,
and showed non parametric (convergence of kernel density estimators (resp. empirical cumu-
lated distribution function estimators) to a limit sample distribution density (resp cumulated
distribution function) and parametric results (convergence of the maximum weighted likeli-
hood estimator. In their papers, they emphasize that the informative selection process can
produce dependence among observations, an issue that is not part of the scope of many
papers about informative selection.
Following Scott (1977), the definition of informative selection used in these paper consists
in saying that informative selection occurs when the distribution of what is observed is dif-
ferent from the distribution that would have been obtained from a simple random sampling.
Still the definition provided in these papers is not as complete as the definition of the current
paper.
C.10. Miscellanous papers
?A sampling design that produces a correlation between selection probabilities and observed
values for sampled units is referred to as informative.
(Berger & Wolpert, 1988, Section 3.5, pp. 41.3–41.4 ) cites: Kalbfleisch
65
C.11. Barnard, Jenkins and Winsten (1962)
the relationships between parametric and sample spaces restricting the use of the likelihood
principle.
Appendix D: Informative designs in Geo statistics
In geo-statistics, the term ”informative design” denotes an ”optimal design” in the sense
that some desing may not contain any information.
Appendix E: On the role of the sample size, of labels,
exchangeability and symmetric functions
A series of papers on the role of labels, e.g. the information carried by labels, if they are
identifiable or not (which makes it difficult to use the design variable information) seems
out of scope for this paper. Nevertheless, the notion was studied by Scott and the question
is important for survey sampling, as the case of unidentifiable units often occurs. It is then
important to propose a definition for informative design that applies in the case of non
identifiable designs. This also explains why we took care to define the random variables R,
the sample to population indexes mapping, that can be observable or latent. We give some
notes below on these papers. The paper by Scott & Smith (1973) for example was written
at a time of a controversy around the role of randomisation, and the role of the labels was
important to discuss. It is now clear that a sample index should be non informative, it should
just be a record index in a file. What is informative is the potential information related to
the index, e.g. the mapping between this index and the population, index as long as the
population index is linked to informative auxiliary information, or in the case of latent with
replacement sampling.
E.1. Durbin (1969), Inferential aspects of the randomness of
sample size in survey sampling
Durbin (1969) is cited by Dawid 1977. It just discusses as title indicates whether one should
use the information provided by the sample size, including when some testing is to be made.
In Chapter 4, the author assumes that the distribution of the sample sixe depends on one or
more unknown parameters but does not depend on the parameter of interest. Last section
gives a discussion (general remarks) on conditional tests or unconditional tests. The authors
discuss failed attempts by Fisher to build a theory about conditional tests given the ancilliary.
The author also refers to?.
E.2. ScottSmith1973
Scott & Smith (1973) Not much in this paper of interest for our definition. Scott & Smith
(1973) mention the fact that sometimes units on the sample are not identifiable. This is
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an example that can happen today when data is de-identified. This paper mentions that
the problem of not identifiable sample units was also described in Godambe (1966), Ericson
(1969), ?). A whole section is titled “2. The role of labels”. This paper is not helpful for
the definition of informativeness, although it is discussing how to account for the design in
specific situations. The goal of the paper is to focus on the exchangeability of the sample
distribution, and to derive some properties from the exchangeability situation. This explains
why they started by discussin the role of labels. There is no mention about informative or
non informative design in this paper.
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Appendix F: Old sections
F.1. At random transformation and non informative
transformation
For (V, V¯ ) ⊵ (Ω,SΩ), define:
AtrandomizeV¯ /V ∶ P →, P ↦ ⟨ v¯ ↦ P (V,v¯)∣Φv¯,V¯ ,V ∣P V¯ ⟩⊓V,V¯ ,
as well as
AtrandomizeV /V¯ ∶ P →, P ↦ ⟨v ↦ P (V¯ ,v)∣Φv,V,V¯ ∣P V ⟩⊓V¯ ,V .
If (P ↦ P V , P ↦ (v¯ ↦ P (v,V¯ ∣V =V )) Ü P and P ′ = {P V¯ ∣ P ∈ P}
then P⋆ = {AtrandomizeV¯ /V (P ) ∣ P ∈ P}. If (V, V¯ ) Ü Ω, then
AtrandomizeV /V¯ (P ) = AtrandomizeV¯ /V (P ) = (P V ⊗P V¯ )⊓V,V¯ .
Example 19. Consider two discrete variables (V, V¯ ) with values in {(0,0), (0,1), (1,1)}
such that (V, V¯ ) = IdΩ. The following tables represent the joint probability
P ({V, V¯ ) = (v, v¯)}) (.,0) (.,1) (.,0) (.,1) (.,0) (.,1)(0, .) 1/6 1/2 1/3 1/3 1/3 1/2(1, .) 1/3 0 1/3 1/2 1/6 0
Definition 22. V¯ is at random with respect to V and P if 1. (V, V¯ ) ⊵ (Ω,SΩ), 2. ∀P ∈ P,
AtrandomizeV¯ /V (P ) = P , and 3. (P ↦ P V , P ↦ (v ↦ P V¯ ∣V =v)) Ü P.
F.2. Sufficient conditions for ignorability for likelihood based
inference
Consider θ ∶ P → such that θ ≺ P ↦ P V and such that ∃θ¯ for which θ, θ¯ Ü P. Then the
random variable V¯ is at random for the target (θ, θ¯) by opposition to V given X is observed
if
1. (P ↦ P V , P ↦ (v¯ ↦ P (v,V¯ ∣V =V )) Ü P
2. (P ↦ P V ,
3.
4.
∃ a (θ, θ¯)-specific sufficient statistic S in the model P and conditionnally on X = x if:
∀P ∈ P, ∃s0 ∈ S(Ω) such that P S∣X=x-a.s.(s), P V¯ ∣S=s = (AtrandomizeV,V¯ (P ))V¯ ∣S=s0 (17)
Definition 23 (“At random”). Let (θ, θ¯) ⊵ P, (V, V¯ ) ⊵ (Ω,SΩ). The random variable V¯
is at random for the target (θ, θ¯) by opposition to V given X is observed if ∃ a (θ, θ¯)-specific
sufficient statistic S in the model P and conditionnally on X = x if:
∀P ∈ P, ∃s0 ∈ S(Ω) such that P S∣X=x-a.s.(s), P V¯ ∣S=s = (AtrandomizeV,V¯ (P ))V¯ ∣S=s0 (18)
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The random variable V is at random for the target (θ, θ¯) by opposition to V¯ given X
is observed if ∃ a (θ, θ¯)-specific sufficient statistic S in the model P such that (18) holds
PX-a.s.(x)
In general, P (V,V¯ ) = P (V,V¯ )∣V¯ =v.P V . Considering that V is “at random” consists in consid-
ering that P (V,V¯ )∣V¯ =v¯ = P V ⊗ Diracv¯, so that P (V,V¯ ) = P (V,V¯ ∣V¯ =v).P V . In order to create the
“at random version” of a model, one needs to define the function
AtrandomizeV¯ /V ∶ P →, P ↦ ⟨ v¯ ↦ P V ∣Φv¯,V¯ ,V (A)∣P V¯ ⟩⊓V¯ ,V
Assuming that P is at random for V , consists in assuming that ∀P ∈ P,
Ignoring the random process that generates V consists in replacing the model P by
⋃P ∈P ignoreV,V¯ (P )). Note that this new model is now parametrized by P ×V (Ω), although
this parametrization may not be bijective (two parameters may point to the same element).
This is what I had in mind before The random variable V is at ramdom with respect to θ(P ) provided
we conditionnally on X = x if there exists at least one sufficient statistic S with respect to θ(P ) such that
∀P ∈ P, ∃s0 ∈ s(X ) such that P
S∣X=x − a.s.(s), fV ∣S=s(v) = fV ∣S=s0(v). (19)
The random variable V is uniformly at ramdom with respect to θ(P ) given X is observed if there exists
at least one sufficient statistic S with respect to θ(P ) such that
∀P ∈ P, ∃s0 ∈ s(X ) such that P
S∣X=x − a.s.(s), PV ∣S=s = PV ∣S=s0 (20)
Example 20 (Transformation at random). Assume a model where Y is minimal sufficient
in P for θ ∶ P ↦ P Y , and that one observes X = T [Y ], then the transformation T is said
at random conditionnally on X = x with respect to θ if:
∀P ∈ P, ∃y⋆ ∈ Y such that P Y ∣T [Y ]=y⋆ − a.s.(y), fT ∣Y =Y (t) = fT ∣S=s0;θ¯(t). (21)
When the observation is X = x(T [Y ], T,Z), the transformation T is said (uniformly) at
random if condition (21) holds PX-a.s.(x),e.g. if:
∀(θ, θ¯) ∈ Γ, PX
θ,θ¯
− a.s.(x), ∃s0 ∈ Y such that P S∣X=xθ,θ¯ − a.s.(s), P T ∣S=sθ,θ¯ = P T ∣S=s0θ,θ¯ . (22)
Example 21 (Missing at random). Rubin (1976, Definition 1, p.584 ), given a selection
without replacement from a superpopulation model, defines missing data missing at random
[conditionally to the observation of I = i and T [Y ] = y⋆] as ∀(θ, θ¯) ∈ Γ, ∃y0 ∈ Y such that
P
Y ∣T [Y ]=y⋆
θ,θ¯
− a.s.(y), f1−I ∣Y =y;θ,θ¯(1 − i) = f1−I ∣Y =y0;θ,θ¯(1 − i). (Symbols φ, u˜, u(1), m˜ in Rubin
(1976) notations corresponds to θ¯, y, y⋆, 1 − I in our notations). Note that Rubin (1976)
definition is slightly different as he defines φ as the parameter of P I ∣Y , so in our notations,
φ is a function of (θ, θ¯). Note also that Rubin Definition 1 is ambiguous: “The missing data
are missing at random if for each value of φ, gφ(m˜ ∣ u˜) takes the same values for all u(0).”
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can be translated into: ∀(θ, θ¯) ∈ Γ, ∃C such that P Y ∣T [Y ]=y⋆
θ,θ¯
a.s(y), Eθ,θ¯[1−I ∣ Y = y] = C. but
may also mean: ∃C such that ∀(θ, θ¯) ∈ Γ, P Y ∣T [Y ]=y⋆a.s(y)Eθ,θ¯[1 − I ∣ Y = y] = C, which is
different. Example 1 of Rubin (1976) though shows that the first interpretation is the right
one.
Rubin (1976) gives a definition of what ignoring the missing data mechanism means un-
der a model dominated by a σ-finite measure, and the definition of ignorable missing data
mechanism may be deduced from (Rubin, 1976, Th. 6.2, ): first Rubin (1976) defines what
is ignoring the missing data mechanism, then this theorem gives sufficient conditions on the
missing data mechanism for the inference when ignoring the missing data mechanism to be
equivalent to the inference when not ignoring it: we deduce it corresponds to the definition
of an ignorable mechanism. We propose a more general defintion that applies in our general
framework:
Remark 4. Note that the definition of “at random” conditionnally to T = t (Definition 20,
condition (21)) requires to use densities, which requires that the model is dominated.
F.2.1. R-ignorable random variable with respect to h(P )
Definition 24 (R-Ignorable transformation). The random variable V is uniformly R-
ignorable with respect to θ(P ) given X is observed if there exist a sufficient statistic S =
s(X) for h(P ) derived from X and a distinct complement V¯ of V such that
∀P ∈ P, P V − a.s.(v), P S∣V =v = P S[classV (v,V¯ )]. (23)
The random variable V is R-ignorable with respect to θ(P ) conditionnaly on X = x if there
exists a sufficient statistic S = s(X) for h(P ) derived from X and a distinct complement V¯
of V such that
∀P ∈ P, fS∣V =v(s) = fS[classV (v,V¯ )](s). (24)
Ignoring the random variable V consists in doing as if P V −a.s.(v), P S∣V =v = P S[classV (v,V¯ )]
when doing the inference. Which is equivalent to condider that
Remark 5. In “R-ignoraribility”, “R” stands for “Rubin”. This choice was made to dif-
ferentiate the concepts of ignorability introduced by Rubin (1976) and the general concept of
ignorability.
Definition 25 (Noninformative random variable). The random variable V is said non-
informative contitional to X = x with respect to θ(P ) if and only if ∃θ¯, V¯ distinct com-
plements of θ and V respectively such that
1. V is R-ignorable with respect to θ(P ) conditionnaly on X = x (R-Ignorability),
2. P V ∣x[classV (v,V¯ )]=x does not depend on θ(P )(+ Ancillarity).
The assertion P V does not depend on θ(P ) is equivalent to ∃θ¯ a distinct complement of θ
such that ∀P,P ′ ∈ P, θ¯(P ) = θ¯(P ′)⇒ P V = (P ′)V .
The random variable V is said (uniformly) non-informative given X is observed with
respect to θ(P ) if for the same distinct complement V¯ of V .
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1. V is (uniformly) R-ignorable with respect to θ(P ) (R-Ignorability)
2. and if P V does not depend on θ(P ) (+ Ancillarity).
The assertion P V does not depend on θ(P ) is equivalent to ∃θ¯ a distinct complement of θ
such that ∀P,P ′ ∈ P, θ¯(P ) = θ¯(P ′)⇒ P V = (P ′)V .
F.3. Definitions of at random, non informative and R-ignorable
transformation
F.3.1. Ignorable Transformation
Definition 26 (Ignorable transformation). When the observation is the couple (T [Y ], T ),
the transformation T is said (uniformly) ignorable with respect to θ if and only if
∀θ, θ¯ ∈ Γ, P T
θ,θ¯
− a.s.(t), P T [Y ]∣T=t
θ,θ¯
= P t(Y )θ . (25)
When the observation is the couple (T [Y ], T ), the transformation T is said ignorable con-
ditionnaly on T [Y ] = y⋆ and T = t with respect to θ if
∀θ, θ¯ ∈ Γ, fT [Y ]∣T=t;θ,θ¯(y⋆) = ft(Y );θ(y⋆). (26)
Ignoring the transformation consists in doing as if P
T [Y ]∣T=t
θ,θ¯
= P t(Y )θ in the inference.
Remark 6 (Ignorability). The choice of using the term ignorable for defining a transfor-
mation that have the properties of Defintion 26 was made to be consistent with Rubin (1976)
definition of ignorable non response. Note that very regrettably “T is an ignorable transfor-
mation” in this sense does not mean that “T is ignorable” in the original sense of ignorability
in statistics. An ignorable statistic is any statistic that is independent on at least one suffi-
cient statistic (Schervish (1995, p. 142, Exercise 33)). Example 24 shows a case where T can
be a non ignorable selection in the sense of Definition 26 and an ignorable statistic in the
classical sense: the use of the term ignorable by Rubin (1976) conflicts with the more general
meaning of ignorable in statistics.
Example 22 (Selecting the maximum). Suppose Yk ∼ Uniform([0, θ]), and our sample
consists of the maximum observed value of Y . Here, R[1] = argmaxk∈U Yk, T [Y ] = YR[1] =
maxk(Y ), and T is the function T ∶ y ↦ yR[1]. Y is not independent of T , but T [Y ] and
T are independent. The selection is not ignorable as P T -a.s.(t), P t(Y ) = Uniform([0, θ]) ≠
P T [Y ] = Pmax(Y ).
Remark 7. In Example 22, T [Y ] and T are independent, and the selection is not ignorable,
it just ensures that P T − a.s(t), P T [Y ]∣T=t
θ,θ¯
= P T [Y ]
θ
.
Proof. Let t ∈ T (Ω), (θ, θ¯) ∈ Γ. The following is always true: P T [Y ]∣T=t
θ,θ¯
= P t(Y )∣T=t
θ,θ¯
. In-
dependence implies that P
T [Y ]∣T=t
θ,θ¯
= P T [Y ]
θ,θ¯
. For all P T [Y ]-measurable set A, We have
P
T [Y ]
θ,θ¯
(A) = ∫ P t(Y )∣T=tθ,θ¯ (A)dP T (t). As T and Y are independent, P Y ∣T=tθ,θ¯ = P Yθ,θ¯ = P Yθ .
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Remark 8. Example 22 is an extreme case of independence of T [Y ] and T were P T −
a.s(t), T [Y ] = t(Y ). A less extreme case consists in taking the sample consisting of the units
with the largest values for the design variable Z, that we assume positively correlated with
Y . Once again, T and T [Y ] are independent, and the selection non ignorable.
Remark 9. In Example 22, one could have defined T differently, as the function T ∶ y ↦
max(y), but in this case, T is not a selection, according to our definition of a selection,
and then we cannot talk about ignorability of the selection. In this case the transformation
is ignorable: with probability 1, T is the function max, and P T [Y ]∣T=max = Pmax(Y ). This
example shows the subtility of the defintion of ignorable selection and the necessity to first
define selection.
Property 4 (Ignorability and likelihood). Assume ignorable selection, the full likelihood
of θ is
L ((θ, θ¯)↦ θ;G)(θ; (y⋆, t)) = sup
θ¯
{L ((θ, θ¯)↦ (θ, θ¯), t(Y ))(θ, θ¯;y⋆)×L ((θ, θ¯)↦ (θ, θ¯);T )(θ, θ¯; t)}.
When the transformation is ignorable, it does not mean that ignoring the transformation
will result in the same analysis than when not ignoring it: it consists in ignoring the in-
formation brought by T . The inference is still valid, but one does not use all the informa-
tion available. Ignoring the selection consists in replacing L ((θ, θ¯) ↦ θ;G)(θ; (y⋆, t)) by
L (θ ↦ θ; t(Y ))(θ; (y⋆)). In addition to the ignorabilty condition, a sufficient condition for
the two likelihoods to be equivalent is that L ((θ, θ¯)↦ (θ, θ¯);T )(θ, θ¯; t) does not depend on θ
F.3.2. Non Informative Transformation
The notions of at random and ignorable tell us when a transformation can be ignored. To
propose a definition of non informative transformation, we must make it consistent with
the concept of information of Fisher. It is possible that the transformation can be ignored:
the analysis will still be valid, but should not, as by ignoring the transformation, we are
discarding some contribution to the likelihood of the transformation. This is also the spirit
of the heuristic definition given by Pfeffermann et al. (1998): selection is informative when it
has to be accounted for in the inference process. Following Scott (1977), another hint for the
definition would be the idea that selection is non informative if the “sample distribution” is
the same than the “population distribution”, which lead to conclude, in a specific framework
that simple random sampling was the only uniformly non informative design. This idea was
used by Bonne´ry (2011), and Bonne´ry et al. (2012) to propose a definition that consisted
in saying that the selection was non informative if the likelihood of the observation was the
same than the one that would have been obtained with a simple random sampling. The
following definition conciliates those approaches.
Definition 27 (Noninformative transformation). The transformation T is said (uniformly)
non-informative given T [Y ] and T are observed for estimation of θ if
1. T is (uniformly) ignorable for estimation of θ (Ignorability)
2. and if P T
θ,θ¯
does not depend on θ (+ T contains no information).
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The transformation T is said non-informative contitional to T [Y ] = t(y) and T = t with
respect to θ if T is ignorable with respect to θ conditionnaly on T [Y ] = y⋆ and if P T ∣T [Y ]=y⋆
θ,θ¯
does not depend on θ (e.g, ∀(θ0, θ¯0) ∈ Γ, [(θ, θ¯0) ∈ Γ⇒ P T ∣T [Y ]=y⋆θ0,θ¯0 = P T ∣T [Y ]=y⋆θ,θ¯0 ])
Those two definitions allow to answer different questions: “can we ignore the information
given by the transformation ?” and “should we ignore the information given by the trans-
formation”? In ignorable transformation, one can ignore the transformation, and still, the
inference will be valid in some sense. In non informative transformation, the transformation
is ignorable in the sense of Rubin (1976) and also ancillary. The example below shows a
transformation that is both ignorable and informative.
How did we decide to combine the two conditions of ignorability, and absence of infor-
mation on θ in the transformation to produce the defintion of informative selection ? We
followed the heuristic of existing papers. As discussed in the introduction, when defining
many authors focus on the differnce between sample and population distributions to define
informative selection. Other authors will prefer to focus on the fact that the inclusion prob-
abilities, even after conditioning on some auxiliary variables, still contain information on the
distribution parameters, via their dependence to the study variable. This definition seems to
be the one that will get the largest consensus.
Example 23 (An ignorable transformation can be informative). Assume that Y ∼
Bernoulli(θ)⊗2, and T is the transformation associated with simple random sampling of size
1 between 2 with probability θ, and the idendity with probability 1 − θ:
T =
RRRRRRRRRRRRRR
∶ (y1, y2)↦ y1 with probability θ/2
∶ (y1, y2)↦ y2 with probability θ/2
∶ (y1, y2)↦ (y1, y2) with probability 1 − θ
Then the transformation is ignorable and informative: for i ∈ {1,2}, P T [Y ]∣T=∶y↦yiθ = P Yi, and
P
T [Y ]∣T=∶y↦(y1,y2)
θ = P Y1,Y2. In terms of likelihood, L(T [Y ] = y;T =∶ y ↦ y1) = (θ/2) fY1;θ(y):
the observation of the selection is informative.
In this example, the parameter space is not separated: Γ ≠ Θ× Θ¯. Indeed, the model can be
re-written Y ∼ Bernoulli(θ)⊗2,
T =
RRRRRRRRRRRRRR
∶ (y1, y2)↦ y1 with probability θ¯/2
∶ (y1, y2)↦ y2 with probability θ¯/2
∶ (y1, y2)↦ (y1, y2) with probability 1 − θ¯
,
and Γ = {θ, θ¯ ∈ Θ × Θ¯ ∣ θ = θ¯}. Then the transformation is ignorable and informative: for
i ∈ {1,2}, P T [Y ]∣T=∶y↦yi
θ
= P Yi, and P T [Y ]∣T=∶y↦(y1,y2)
θ
= P Y1,Y2. In terms of likelihood, L(T [Y ] =
y;T =∶ y ↦ y1) = (θ/2) fY1;θ(y): the observation of the selection is informative.
This situation, because it has no practical interest, was not considered in (Rubin, 1976,
Theorem 7.1), that assumes that [θ] is distinct from [θ¯] (e.g. Γ = Θ × Θ¯) and states that
missing at random ensures that the likelihood ratio obtained after ignoring missing data
equals the correct likelihood ratio. In practice, θ¯ and θ are distinct. But here the idea is to
propose a general mathematical definition and to explore its aspects.
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Example 24 (Where T is an informative non ignorable transformation, and T is an
ignorable statistic). Assume that Y ∼ Normal(0, σ2)⊗N , and T is the selection associ-
ated with R = (argmin(Yk ∣ k ∈ {1, . . . ,N}),argmax(Yk ∣ k ∈ {1, . . . ,N})). Then here
T [Y ] = (min(Y ),max(Y )) and T [Y ] is independent of T . Given R = (1,5), T is the function
t ∶ y ↦ (y1, y5), and P t(Y ) = P (Y1,Y5) ≠ P T [Y ]∣T=t = Pmin(Y ),max(Y ). So the selection is non ig-
norable, and informative, although P T
θ,θ¯
does not depend on θ, as unconditionnally on Y , T is
a simple random sampling, so the variable T is ancillary, and ignorable as it is independent
on the sufficient statistic T [Y ].
Remark 10. Example 24 shows that informative selection does not necessarily mean that
the selection T contains information on θ. Non ignorability is sufficient to get informative-
ness.
Remark 11 (Non informative selection and design-based inference). As pointed out in
Bonne´ry (2011), under the design-based setting, where D, and Y are considered non random,
and the parametric space Γ is separated (e.g. Γ = Θ×Θ¯, the selection is always ignorable. We
could find a definition of informative selection for fixed population models in the litterature:
Cassel et al. (1977, p. 12) defines a non informative design as a design such that design
variable depend on study variables, but this definition is inconsistent with the fixed population
framework described in the book design variables are not random, so necessarily independent.
One could think that dependence here means functional dependence, in which case, it is very
limiting as it corresponds to a case of non separation between Θ and Θ¯. Our conclusion
is that it is not pertinent to consider the notion of informative selection in a pure fixed
population model, as by nature of the model, all selections are non informative. For the
notion of informativeness to be pertinent, one needs to apply it to a model where at least
Z ∣ Y is random.
Property 5 (Sufficient condition for ignorability:Independence of T and Y ). When
∀(θ, θ¯) ∈ Γ, T and Y are independent, and G = (T,T [Y ]) is observed, the transformation is
ignorable for the estimation of θ(θ) = θ.
Proof. Assume T and Y are independent, let t ∈ T (Ω), (θ, θ¯) ∈ Γ. Then P T [Y ]∣T=t
θ,θ¯
= (P Y ∣T=t
θ,θ¯
)
t
.
As T and Y are independent, P
Y ∣T=t
θ,θ¯
= P Y
θ,θ¯
= P Yθ . So P T [Y ]∣T=tθ,θ¯ = P t(Y )θ .
Remark 12 (Rubin 1976). In Rubin (1976) the question of the amount of information
brought by T is ignored, the authors only consider G = T [Y ], the paper does not answer
the question of what to do if we observe G = (T [Y ], T ). It shows that the definition of
ignorability and informative selection must also depend on G. In this paper, we propose a
general definition for all possible G (see .
Property 6 (Link to likelihood and density). Assuming that X = (T [Y ], T ), that all
densities and conditional densities are defined, and that {PX
θ,θ¯
}(θ,θ¯)∈Γ is dominated by a σ-
finite measure ζ, then the following propositions are equivalent:
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1. The transformation T is non informative for estimation of θ given X = (T [Y ], T ).
2. ∀θ ∈ Θ, θ¯ ∈ Θ¯, ζ-a.s.(y⋆, t),
L ((θ, θ¯)↦ θ;G)(θ; (y⋆, t)) = L (θ ↦ θ, t(Y ))(θ;y⋆)
3. ∀θ, θ¯ ∈ Θ× Θ¯, ζ-a.s.(y⋆, t), f(T [Y ],T );θ,θ¯(y⋆, t) = f(t(Y ));θ(y⋆)fT ;θ,θ¯(t) and fT ;θ,θ¯(t) does not
depend on θ.
Note that Rubin (1976) does not specify the nature of the model (Pθ,θ¯)θ,θ¯∈Θ×Θ¯, in particular,
there is no comment relative to the model being dominated by a σ-finite measure, although
this condition is implicitely implied by the use of densities.
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